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Prologue
A state welfare agency is about to evict homeless women and their
children, AFDC recipients, from emergency housing. The bureaucracy
has decreed by regulation, and is now ready to enforce, a one hundred
day limit for AFDC "special needs" housing assistance. Welfare motel
residents tell legal clinic staff members this alarming news during out-
reach. Stark, opposing images arise: mothers and their children at risk
of being thrown out on the streets with nowhere to go; a faceless welfare
bureaucracy that understands the words of its own regulations and the
fiscal bottom line, but fails to comprehend the lives and risks involved.
Homeless women are interviewed, their stories are told and received,
lawyers prepare for legal battle.
Prior to the start of litigation, the state agency sends a letter to
emergency housing residents, identifying for each an apartment purport-
edly available through the federal "Section 8" low-income housing
program:
This apartment will be inspected and will be decent, safe, and af-
fordable housing, and meet all Section 8 housing code specifications.
We are attempting to place a large number of families by the
[emergency housing] deadline and due to this emergency, will be un-
able to offer you any additional apartments. You must leave [your
current] motel or emergency apartment by [next week's] deadline, even
if you do not accept the above listed apartment.
If you do not accept this apartment, it will be your responsibility
to find another one within the Section 8 time limits as described at
your [previous] briefing session.'
At the hearing to enjoin the state's termination of emergency hous-
ing assistance, the women speak out about the state's broken promises,
the unresponsive bureaucratic treatment they have endured, and the obli-
gations and rights at issue. Tori M. takes the stand and tells the follow-
ing story:
1. Letter from State of Connecticut Department of Human Resources to AFDC recipi-
ents of special needs emergency housing (Mar. 30, 1989) (on file vith author) (emphasis in
original).
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I am eighteen years old. I have a daughter. She's seventeen
months. I'm expecting a child in June. I looked for apartments, but
my income [from state assistance] is too low for a two-bedroom apart-
ment for me and my daughter. [After eviction from emergency hous-
ing] my social worker told me I could be placed in a shelter [in another
town]. I didn't [accept it] because I'm attending school to get my
GED and I'm also-I go into premature labor a lot and I need to be
near a hospital and I'm on medication.
I was given an apartment with my [Section 8] certificate, but I
called and the man told me that the apartment that I was given was
already rented a week before. [I was told] that if we didn't accept it,
we had to find our own. You know, I'm still looking.
I went back to my grandparents and asked them if I could stay
there. It would just be crowded there. Me and my grandmother and
my daughter, we'd be in one bed.
2
Relying on client stories such as Tori's, the lawyers prove irrepara-
ble harm and win an injunction. Before the appellate court, however, the
clinic legalistically argues:
The legislature has imposed a legal duty on the Commissioner of
Income Maintenance to provide assistance to AFDC families to enable
every dependent child to be supported in a home.
The legislature, through an express statutory requirement... has
required that the AFDC program be administered in such a way that
every child in the program be supported ".... in a home in this state,
suitable for his upbringing, which [the child's] relative maintains as his
own."... The trial court's decision does nothing more than require
that defendant obey the law as expressed by the legislature.
3
In its decision, the appellate court notes the stories of the women
and their children only in passing, adopting the clinic's narrow, legalistic
interpretation of issues and claims. But the court refuses to adopt the
clinic's reading of the applicable statute and finds for the state,
commenting:
The interpretation of the provision of § 17-85 relied upon by the
plaintiffs wholly ignores the context in which it is placed. Section 17-
85 is entitled "Eligibility. Consideration of stepparent's income." The
first, second, third and fifth sentences of subsection (a) set forth various
conditions relating solely to the eligibility of AFDC recipients, and
subsection (b) similarly establishes an additional eligibility criterion.4
2. I recount Tori M.'s story in abbreviated form from the hearing transcript. Hearing
Transcript at 106-14, Savage v. Aronson, No. CVNH-8904-3142 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hsing.
Sess. Apr. 18, 1989), rev'd, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) [hereinafter April 18 Hearing
Transcript]. I use her words, but omit the lawyer's questions and the interruptions from the
judge and opposing counsel.
3. Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief at 5, Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696
(1990) (No. 13796) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-85(a) (1988)).
4. Savage, 214 Conn. at 274, 571 A.2d at 706.
April 1992] POVERTY LAW NARRATIVES
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
From frustrated and frightened families arbitrarily denied promised
state action, to a potentially empowering experience of having their
voices and stories heard in court, to a technical argument about statutory
context and duty. Something, it seems, got lost in translation. Unfortu-
nately, there is no reason to think that this case is singular. It reflects a
familiar dissonance in poverty law practice, an overriding tension be-
tween poor clients' lived experience and the manner in which that experi-
ence is perceived and acted upon by poverty lawyers who feel constrained
by the strictures of law and the limits of legal argument.
Introduction
In critical exploration of the dissonance between law, lawyers, and
the disempowered, 5 recent inquiries have given rise to new, enriched the-
ories about the knowledge and discourse of the poverty lawyer. Critical
scholars and practitioners are now engaged in a search for alternative
theoretical and practical approaches to working for and with clients
whose different perspectives, needs, and values do not fit neatly into
traditional conceptions of legal process and doctrine. Critical theory
questions the authority of definitional limits that are revealed by the con-
text of real experience, a context often rendered invisible by the bounds
of legal discourse.6
Poverty lawyers necessarily participate in this discourse. The pro-
ject of critical practice and theory, however, is to develop theory rooted
in practice in order to learn from and about, and then improve upon, the
lawyer's participation as representative of those who are disempowered
by the operation and interpretation of law.7 This requires not just the
integration of practice and theory, but also the integration of different
critical theories and different methods of practice. By design, if not by
definition, the project must be accessible to practitioners as well as schol-
5. Throughout this Article I refer interchangeably to "disempowered" and "poor" peo-
ple. Although people are subjugated for many reasons other than poverty, the subjects of this
Article are persons who are disadvantaged, oppressed, and exploited because of their class and
economic standing. I acknowledge that this includes a diverse group of subjects: women,
children, and men, people of all races, sexual orientations, and physical and mental capabili-
ties. Thus, I recognize the fragmentation and division among poor people. See Austin Sarat,
"... The Law is All Over" Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor,
2 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 343, 348 (1990).
6. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAvW
PROFESSOR 109-10 (1991).
7. See, eg., Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on
Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992); Margaret Russell, Entering Great
America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1992).
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ars, and those who think and write about new approaches to practice
must critically examine scholarly works to assess the practicality and ef-
fectiveness of theoretical ideas and visions. Advancing the project re-
quires avoiding the "postmodern version of the relation between theory
and practice[:] discourse unto death [where] theory begets no practice,
only more text."'8 Critical practice and theory must begin by addressing
the traditional hesitancy of both practitioners and scholars to deal faith-
fully and consistently with specific and overlapping client, lawyer, and
lawyer-client contexts. 9
In this Article I undertake a critical storytelling approach' ° to pov-
erty law practice' that centers on the contexts of law and legal practice.
This approach conceptualizes law as both: a social institution through
which people tell stories about their relationships with others and with
the state; and an authoritative language, or discourse, with the power to
8. Catharine MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Any-
way?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 13 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, From Practice to The-
ory]; see Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
971 (1992).
9. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REv. 697, 699,
719-22 (1992) [hereinafter Dinerstein, Clinical Texts] (most recent and ambitious textbooks on
lawyering fail to recognize full import of situational, relational, psychological, and interper-
sonal contexts and their impact on lawyer-client relation); Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Trans-
formation of Lawyering: A Response to Naomi Cahn, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 1071 (1992) (feminist
critique of lawyering must be grounded in actual experiences of lawyers whose actions and
experiences have been shaped in particular, distinct ways); Lucie White, Paradox, Piece- Work
and Patience, 43 Hastings L.J. 853 (1992) [hereinafter White, Piece-Work] (intellectually for-
mal theoretical approaches to poverty lawyering falsify vision of lawyer and client realities).
10. Storytelling is a useful heuristic for law and legal institutions. See generally Sympo-
sium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); Symposium, Pedagogy of Narrative,
40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990). Storytelling can be a method for revealing realities of experience
and oppression often hidden by legal principles and process. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUsTICE (1987); WILLIAMS, supra note
6. For a critique of legal storytelling method, see Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Story-
telling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989). For
reasons why "voice" or storytelling scholarship is important to nontraditional members of the
legal community, see Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH L. REv. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]; Richard
Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95, 109
(1990) ("[Voice scholarship] can sharpen our concern, enrich our experience, and provide ac-
cess to stories beyond the stock tale. Heeding new voices can stir our imaginations, and let us
begin to see life through the eyes of the outsider.").
11. At the outset I confess my empathy with lawyers who practice poverty law, despite
the engulfing context of resource constraints. See, eg., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAW-
YERS 127-41 (1989) (discussing various means through which legal services may be provided
to those unable to afford them). The point of this Article's critique is to further the project of
joining theory with practice in order to enhance understanding of law, enrich lawyer practice,
and improve client representation.
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suppress stories and experiences not articulated in accepted forms. 12
Contextualization is fundamental to legal storytelling; the storyteller
must be able to provide enough information about herself and her situa-
tion to transfer to the story receiver-through meanings and images-
her perspective, beliefs, and values. The storytelling dilemma in law
arises when authoritative discourse and knowledge impede the transfer of
the storyteller's meanings and images. Hence the receiver's interpretive
understanding of the story often is at odds with the message intended by
the teller.13
Stories 14 are a medium of communication15 linking the law, poverty
lawyer, poor client, and legal decisionmaker. From the perspective of
the poverty lawyer, there are four different, though related, types of sto-
ries: (1) stories told by clients (and received by lawyers); (2) stories told
by lawyers (and received by legal decisionmakers such as judges, hearing
12. Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 888 (1989); see Sally
Engle Merry, The Discourse of Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1,
3-4 (1990) ("discourse" is a distinct way of talking about and interpreting events that includes
categories and vocabulary for naming events and explaining actions and relationships). Law
and literature scholars understand the project of law as the creation of stories. "[Law] is a way
of telling a story about what has happened in the world and claiming a meaning for it by
writing an ending to it." James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CI. L. REV. 684, 691-92 (1985).
13. This dilemma is explored in "phenomenology"-a philosophy of experience that
stresses the importance of the individual's subjective experience in developing understandings
of law and legal relationships. E.g., Gary Minda, Phenomenology, Tina Turner and the Law,
16 N.M. L. REV. 479 (1986). See generally EDMUND HUSSERL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOL-
OGY (William P. Alston & George Nakhnikian trans., 1964). Understanding of self and others
emerges through interpersonal interpretive acts or "hermeneutics." Robert M. Cover, Vio-
lence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1610 (1986) [hereinafter Cover, Violence]. The ex-
igence of interpretation is discourse that enables conveyance of subjective meaning, situation,
and purpose. The normative nature of the discourse varies according to political values. Com-
pare Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images Critical Legal Theory
and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83) (designating dis-
course as one of "empowerment") with Martha Minow, Interpreting Right. An Essay for Rob-
ert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Interpreting Rights] (designating
discourse as one of "rights").
14. I distinguish "story" from "narrative." Stories are accounts people give to explain
themselves and events. People tell their stories through narratives that reveal their perspec-
tives, experiences, and identities. One story may be told through several interlocking narra-
tives. See, eg., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2114-18 (1991) [hereinafter Allieri, Reconstructive Pov-
erty Law Practice] (story of food stamp reduction told in connected narratives of "dignity,"
"earing," "community," and "rights"). People speak in narratives and tell stories. See gener-
ally ON NARRATIVE (W. Thomas Mitchell ed., 1980) (collection of essays on various social
roles and purposes of narrative).
15. Jiirgen Habermas, Law as Medium and Law as Institution, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN
THE WELFARE STATE 203 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1985).
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officers, and legislators); (3) universalized narratives in the law (com-
posed of positive elements such as rules and principles as well as domi-
nant assumptions and stereotypes reflected in and reenforced by law) that
assign characteristics and define people in certain ways based on their
positions or circumstances; and (4) stories told by legal decisionmakers
to justify their decisions (legal opinions or "judgment stories"). 16
My approach to the above storytelling typology is twofold. First, it
is descriptive: to explain and understand the causes and effects of univer-
salized narratives and how lawyers initially hear and then transform cli-
ent stories. Second, it is normative: to prescribe awareness of
universalized narratives and how lawyers should receive and translate
client stories. The underlying normative questions include: Whose story
should be told in advocacy and why? Who should narrate the story and
from what perspective? Who should play what role in telling, translat-
ing, and interpreting a client's story?17 I do not attempt to draw a clear
distinction between the normative and the descriptive, 18 except in my
concluding case study, which demonstrates how a critical storytelling ap-
proach would have revealed the sources and consequences of lawyer in-
terpretations of client stories and the laws and bureaucratic practices that
affected those stories.
No "correct" substantive norms for poverty lawyering follow from
my analysis. Instead, critical storytelling in the context of poverty law
practice is a way of thinking about and then acting upon the interconnec-
tions between the law, lawyer, and poor client.19 It entails both examin-
16. 1 distinguish "universalized narratives" from "judgment stories" in that the latter
consist of single decisions in specific cases, while the former are more general, implicated by
questions such as, "What does the law say about this situation?" In rendering a judgment
story, a judge finds guidance in universalized narratives woven into past cases. For analysis of
the interpretive acts of judges, see RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Robert M.
Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20
GA. L. REv. 815 (1986) [hereinafter Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation];
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REv. 381 (1989). Because the poverty
lawyer acts as direct participant in only the first three story types, I deal with the fourth type
only in reference to the lawyer goal of structuring, constraining, and influencing the judgment
story.
17. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 65 (1986); cf CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIVES 138
(1988) (discussing normative and epistemological problems and questions now raised about
authorship of ethnographic stories).
18. On the hazy and sometimes false distinction between the normative and the descrip-
tive, see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 811-14
(1991).
19. Because the purpose of critical storytelling in the practice of poverty law is to locate
knowledge in the particulars of the law and in client experience, critical storytelling is both
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ing the law from the client's perspective and examining the client from
the law's perspective.20
In Part I, I analyze how universalized legal narratives affect poverty
lawyers in their practice and poor clients in their everyday activities.
These narratives, manifest in the interactions of legal texts, practices,
principles, rules, precedents, and language, decontextualize both events
and people. Fundamental to authoritative legal discourse, universalized
narratives constrain the way lawyers can tell client stories to legal deci-
sionmakers. As a result, the voices and narratives of poor clients often
go unspoken and unrevealed. Because feminist accounts of law illumi-
nate and explicate the effects of universalized legal narratives, I have
drawn on several examples from feminist scholarship. In particular, I
look at the three related legal narratives of "victim," "family," and
"work."
Legal narratives control the "storylines" of poor people, regulating
their lives in contradictory ways. These contradictions exemplify the in-
fluence of universalized legal narratives by revealing the dissonance be-
tween the lived experience of disempowered people and the dominant
values and perceptions reflected in the law. Because my concluding case
study is a story about homeless women and their children, I focus in
particular on "welfare mother contradictions" arising from state bureau-
cratic practice and substantive welfare law.
Part II investigates how poor clients tell and poverty lawyers receive
stories. I describe the storytelling context in the practice of poverty law
and list the narrative elements of a client's telling of her story. Dis-
empowered clients attempt to persuade both themselves and their law-
yers about the rightness of their position with "rights talk" that connects
the client's background and experiences to the legal dispute and injury.
But the lawyer's previously formed understanding of the client and her
world often acts as a cognitive and social barrier to receiving the client's
story. In order to create space for the client to speak out and tell her
story, that barrier must be acknowledged and overcome. This space can
be created by attempting to adopt the client's perspective when interpret-
ing her story and by engaging the client in dialectic interaction.
Part III begins with a description of how the poverty lawyer tradi-
tionally transforms and recomposes her client's story by devising a script
feminist and pragmatic. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S.
CAL. L. RFv. 1699, 1706-07 (1990).
20. Cf Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Ciii. L. REv. 1, 67 (1988) (feminist
narrative critique explores the rule of law from women's point of view; feminist interpretive
critique aims to explore women from point of view of the rule of law).
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that fits whichever universalized legal narrative the lawyer believes is ad-
vantageous for winning the case. In contrast, as a legal storyteller, the
lawyer acts as "translator" for the client and is thus guided and con-
strained by the client's narrative perspective. Under the translation ap-
proach, poverty law practice incorporates an ethic of storytelling that
requires the integration of legal claims with the personal integrity of the
client and her narrative. The power for law reform lies in infusing the
story told in advocacy with the client's narrative purpose. I conclude
Part III by exploring practical openings for translation, which are found
in the judicial functions of hearing, balancing, and discretion.
In the last Part I return to the stories briefly introduced at the begin-
ning of the Article. The case, Savage v. Aronson,21 provides a study for
critical storytelling analysis. 22 Although my participation in the case af-
fords me insight into the lawyer-client relation that developed, the les-
sons I glean arise from application of the storytelling typology. In
Savage client narratives spoken at the temporary injunction hearing
poignantly demonstrated the requisite irreparable harm-homeless
mothers and their children being forced back out on the streets due to the
expiration of emergency housing assistance-thus enabling the lawyers
to win. I conclude, however, that the lawyers did not perceive and learn
from client narratives and that this resulted in a failure to translate fully
the meaning of the rights and obligations at issue, perhaps contributing
to the Connecticut Supreme Court's eventual overturning of the injunc-
tion. The story of Savage thus provides warnings and indicates possibili-
ties for storytelling in the practice of poverty law.
I. Universalized Legal Narratives
Law constitutes roles and relationships of poor people in two pri-
mary ways. First, at points of contact between disempowered people and
state authority, the form and substance of legal discourse (and here I
21. 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990).
22. I was a member of the Yale Law School Homelessness Clinic that represented the
plaintiff class in Savage v. Aronson, and I helped draft several of the briefs in the temporary
injunction phase of litigation, prepared clients and witnesses for the hearing, and questioned
one client and two other witnesses during the hearing. The lessons I learned from Savage came
as a result of undertaking a critical storytelling analysis long after the case had been decided; I
do not claim lessons learned directly from my own participation in the case. Contra Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14 (lessons of poverty lawyering learned
through specific experience as lawyer); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Client" Think-
ing About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2459 (1989) [hereinafter Cunningham, A Tale
of Two Clients] (same); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mr G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter White, Sunday
Shoes] (same).
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include bureaucratic discourse) constrain the telling, receiving, and inter-
pretation of stories intended to explain, justify, and claim. These con-
straints are embedded within "universalized legal narratives." 23 Second,
positive manifestations of universalized narratives-rules, regulations,
and practices-intrude upon action and consciousness, shaping the direc-
tions of poor people's lives-their "storylines." 24 In this Part I detail the
origin and composition of universalized narratives, provide examples of
such narratives as revealed in feminist practice and theory, and examine
how law intervenes in and directs the storylines of disempowered people.
Because the subjects of the case study in Part IV are poor women and
their lawyers, I focus on contradictions governing the lives of women on
welfare to highlight the effects of universalized narratives in the context
of the state welfare bureaucracy.
A. Composition
Universalized legal narratives emerge from the central tenet of lib-
eral legalism: the "rule of law."' 25 Under liberal legalism, rules of law
expand relationships and empower people to act. Authoritative interpre-
tations of legal rules, principles, and definitions, however, often rely on
unsettled or controversial conceptions of justice and the good, and doc-
trinal disputes are often resolved on political or moral grounds. Critics
of liberalism focus, in part, on this breakdown of the political/legal dis-
tinction in the realm of legal interpretation. For example, critical legal
studies (CLS) scholars believe that the breakdown of the law/politics dis-
tinction results in indeterminate outcomes in legal arenas, and the preser-
vation of power in political ones.26 To facilitate these outcomes, positive
law and its interpretations abstract individuals and human events in or-
23. For stylistic variation, I refer to "universalized legal narratives" alternatively as
"legal narratives" or "universalized narratives."
24. To introduce the concept of law's control over the storylines of the poor, I can do no
better than quote Spencer, a 35 year old man on public assistance and a contributor to Austin
Sarat's illuminating ethnographic study of the welfare poor in New England: "For me the law
is all over. I am caught, you know; there is always some rule that I'm supposed to follow,
some rule I don't even know about that they say." Sarat, supra note 5, at 343.
25. See, eg., DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 93-94 (rule of law of a community is based on
past political decisions establishing rights and responsibilities and enforced by coercive means);
LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 209-14 (1964) (under rule of law government ap-
plies general rules which it has previously declared to be determinative of rights and duties and
which legitimize its assertion of authority).
26. See ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 14-16,
27-28 (1990). For a political history of the evolution of CLS and the development of its major
principles, see Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J.
1515 (1991).
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der to promote behavioral regularity necessary to foster and protect
dominant values.27
The concept of universalized legal narratives incorporates both the
liberal premise and the CLS critique of the rule of law.28 As recurring
accounts of social interactions located within legal texts, precedent, and
language, legal narratives are made up of socially constructed meanings
arising from the interaction of social, cognitive, and rhetorical forces.
Once implanted in legal discourse, they become normative (value-laden)
interpretations of people and events that are difficult to dislodge, but easy
to manipulate.29 When legal recognition or authority is given to an expe-
rience or outcome, it becomes the basis for future abstraction and ideal-
ization about similarly perceived experiences. In other words,
universalized legal narratives are the result of the dominant method of
legal reasoning-abstraction and reduction of meaning to principles and
rules.30
As authoritative stories told in the law, legal narratives assign char-
acteristics and roles to people, constructing the positions from which
they speak. Such narratives have the power to close off dialogue by lo-
cating certain substantive inquiries outside of the law. By restricting
ways of framing questions and arguments, universalized narratives ex-
clude alternative voices and perspectives.31 Legal narratives, however,
are not universal in the abstract: they reflect and incorporate a larger,
27. Like legal realists, CLS adherents believe that abstract social and moral ideals under-
lie legal choices. CLS scholars go one step further and argue that policy analysis and balanc-
ing in the world of legal realism are equally abstract enterprises. See Joel Handler, Dependent
People, The State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA
L. REv. 999, 1035 (1988) [hereinafter Handler, Dependent People] ("Social values, like legal
rules, are so abstract that they can be used to justify any decision.").
28. Universality protects the "regularity, predictability, and perhaps even the stability of
the [legal] system." ALTMAN, supra note 26, at 192.
29. See Schlag, supra note 18, at 803-04. Dominant interpretations include set defini-
tions, models, tests, classifications, and categories, all of which reduce issues, people, and
events to objectified, stable, and universalized forms.
30. See Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cog-
nitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1105, 1227-28 (1989) (discussing constraining influ-
ence of "idealized cognitive models"). For a sociological look at what I call universalized legal
narratives, see Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987); for a jurisprudential and law and literature examination, see
Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 145 (1985); and for a post-structuralist account, see Thomas C. Heller, Legal
Discourse in the Positive State: A Post-Structuralist Account, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE
WELFARE STATE, supra note 15, at 173.
31. See Schlag, supra note 18, at 820-23 (critiquing both foundationalist and moralist
legal thought as exclusionary).
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not always revealed context.32 The content of universalized narratives is
restricted to the experiences, perspectives, and images of those with
power. "[A]pparently neutral and universal rules in effect burden or ex-
clude anyone who does not share the characteristics of privileged, white,
Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual, adult men for whom those rules
were actually written. ' 33
The law thus constrains and limits possible stories a lawyer can tell
on behalf of a disempowered client whose experiences, perspectives, and
images are absent from the dominant legal narratives.34 Concepts such
as "family," "work," "equality," and "welfare" incorporate a pre-estab-
lished set of meanings that make alternative meanings difficult to see and
hear.
[T]he law reinforces certain world views and understandings of events.
Its terms and its reasoning structure are the [vehicle through] which
supplicants before the law must express their needs. Through its defi-
nitions and the way it talks about events, law has the power to silence
alternative meanings-to suppress other stories.35
As a constraining discourse, the law and its institutions establish
form and substance requirements for stories that claim rights or express
needs. Elements include a specified vocabulary for invoking claims, a
paradigm of argumentation, formulae for proof, and narrative conven-
tions for reconstructing individual and collective stories. The conver-
gence of static and exclusive categories, definitional polarities, bright
lines (separating rights from needs, the moral from the immoral, the pub-
lic from the private), and idealized unmediated voices expressing univer-
32. See STANLEY FISH, Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road, in DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY 22 (1989) ("[A]bstract laws are never abstract or universal but are
always reflections of some (albeit unacknowledged) context; and an understanding of context
will never be simply inductive, but will always be produced by principles (themselves contin-
gent and transformable) already in place."); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Con-
text, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1597, 1602-06, 1627-28 (1990).
33. Minow & Spelman, supra note 32, at 1649; see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TO-
WARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 188 (1989) ("[I]n. .. law, the way the male point
of view constructs a social event or legal need will be the way that social event or legal need is
framed by state policy."); Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method, 16 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 373, 391 & n.36 (1991) (neutrality of liberal legalism disguises inevitable per-
spectivity of legal rules); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism
and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1599, 1642 (1991) ("[D]octrinal categories present-
ing themselves as neutral and objective often exclude the perspectives of many while enshrin-
ing a particular view.").
34. See Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 13, at 1912; see also ZILLAH R. EISEN-
STEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAw 43 (1988) ("fTjhe study of law as a discourse is not
limited to specific laws or to the activity of litigation or litigators; rather it is the study of these
laws as they operate as symbols for what is legal, honorable, natural, objective, and so on.").
35. Finley, supra note 12, at 888.
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sal truths, conceals subjectivities and maintains the illusion that the
underlying principles are neutral, unbiased, and unmanipulable. 36 Law's
reproduction of rhetorical structures establishes a dominant way of con-
struing events, naming problems, and determining solutions.
37
Law's predictable patterns, or "coherence," enable lawyers to de-
velop a sense of legal arguments that win cases, given particular sets of
facts. Poverty lawyers also grasp, however, that legal discourse limits
what can be said on behalf of their clients. In order to win cases, poverty
lawyers must fit their clients' stories into law's established terms by
squeezing client identities, histories, and problems into universalized nar-
ratives. 38 The reliance on precedent by both judges and lawyers blocks
the recognition and understanding of stories told that do not fit with past
authoritative accounts. The method of fit and the pull of precedent pro-
duce rigid boundaries that are difficult to transgress. Only questions for-
mulated within the confines of the legal narrative are addressed by the
legal forum; questions determined to be outside the narrative are ignored
or discarded as irrelevant.3
9
Legal narratives are "universalized" when applied to
nonempowered subjects-those disempowered by the differences of race,
class, disability, sexual preference, or gender. Universalization occurs
when legal narratives are applied to diverse individuals in the assumption
(or imposition) of a unified world view, and when differences are ac-
knowledged but then dismissed as naturally occurring and legally irrele-
vant.4° The effect of universalized narratives is the exclusion of norms,
values, and experiences deemed to be different. For the poverty lawyer,
the result is a "legal blindness" to the perspective of those who come to
the legal services office in search of assistance.
B. Feminist Revelations
Feminist scholars explore the ways in which universalized legal nar-
ratives constrain what is known and said about the experiences of histori-
36. See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 8-11; Nancy Fraser, Struggle Over Needs: Outline of
a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late-Capitalist Political Culture, in WOMEN, THE
STATE, AND WELFARE 199, 202-03 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990).
37. See Merry, supra note 12, at 2.
38. I use the term "fit" in its everyday meaning. For a jurisprudential account of the
purpose and method of "fit," see DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 225-58.
39. See Mary Jane Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes, in
AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 283, 296 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds.,
1991) [hereinafter BOUNDARIES].
40. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 50-53 (1990) (discussing un-
stated assumptions about differences).
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cally marginalized and subordinated people. In feminist theory
knowledge is contextual, based upon perspective and experience. One
discovers the meanings and values of rules and doctrines, therefore, only
by understanding their effects on the people subject to them.41 A pri-
mary purpose of feminism 42 is to expose and analyze the exclusion of
women from the traditional scientific and social bodies of kmowledge
upon which legal rules and doctrines are premised.43
Feminists examine the connection between possession of knowledge
about a subject and the resulting power over it, as well as the unstated
assumptions made in the application of knowledge to subject. They in-
quire into the ways in which legal discourse turns explanations posited
by the powerful into purportedly objective doctrines encompassing every-
one. Along with exposing the falsity of doctrinal objectivity by tracing
women's ongoing resistance and denial of the applicability of universal-
ized legal narratives, the feminist goal is to redevelop the law by infiltrat-
ing legal doctrines with alternative narratives. 44
41. See Cynthia Farina, Getting from Here to There, 1991 DuiE L.J. 689, 707 (1991)
[hereinafter Farina, Here to There].
42. A recent conference at Yale, "Feminism in the 90s: Bridging the Gap Between The-
ory and Practice," exemplifies the diversity within feminist thought and action. There are
multiple feminist perspectives on how to "bridge the gap" between theory and practice, a gap
stretching across differences of class, ethnicity, race, and sexual orientation. Preface: Confer-
ence Issue, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (1991); see bell hooks, Theory as Liberatory Practice 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 4 (1991) (efforts of women of color to deconstruct category "wo-
man" insist on recognition that gender is not the sole factor determining constructions of
femaleness); MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, supra note 8, at 20-22 (building theory, out
of diversity of all women's experiences, based on oppression of women as women encompasses
oppression of women on other bases); Celina Romany, Ain't I a Feminist?, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 23, 29 (1991) (to remain a liberation project, feminist legal theory must recognize
its distorted universalizations and draw upon narratives that capture a multiplicity of identi-
ties). For a discussion of different strands of feminist legal thought, see, e.g., Abrams, supra
note 33; Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990); Deborah
L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE
L.J. 1731 (1991) [hereinafter Rhode, "No-Problem"; Robin West, The Difference in Women's
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, in BOUNDARIES, supra
note 39, at 115.
43. Besides excluding the perspectives of women and other disempowered groups, tradi-
tional bodies of knowledge also devalue and denounce alternative perspectives as biased and
unreliable. See MACKINNON, supra note 33, at 99.
44. The falsity of universalized narratives is evidenced by the legal "double bind" women
often face. For example, if lawmakers legislate "special treatment" for pregnant women, such
as paid pregnancy leave and subsequent child care, employers may not hire women (or may do
so grudgingly) because of the perceived short-term financial cost. Alternatively, if pregnant
women are not granted such treatment, they may not be able to retain their jobs. The dilemma
of the double bind only exists because of the universalized narratives of pregnancy and work
embedded within the dominant conceptual framework. For a discussion of the "double bind,"
see Radin, supra note 19, at 1699-1704 (1989).
The danger to be avoided in feminist legal theory is replacement of current dominant
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Feminist scholarship explores the silencing and exclusionary effects
of legal narratives and how those narratives influence and legitimize the
organization and understanding of everyday life.45 The influence and ef-
fect of universalized narratives are revealed through a method of inquiry
that asks and searches for answers to "the woman question": Which
experiences of women are addressed and which are ignored by the law?
What are the assumptions, descriptions, and claims the law makes with
respect to those experiences? What and whose interests does the law pro-
tect? How will various legal solutions and reforms affect women's expe-
rience?46 The power to reveal universalized narratives lies in asking
these questions with respect to all who are disempowered; such inquiry
forms the basis of receiving and translating client stories in poverty law
practice.47
Although legal narratives influence and shape behavior, they often
ring false when applied to individuals and groups about whom the narra-
tives are supposedly told. Contradictions arise when universalized narra-
tives oppose or reduce real experience. For example, in bringing any
type of sex-based claim, whether civil or criminal, a woman is required to
represent herself in a way that may contradict her experience. To
demonstrate harm and win relief, she must recount her ordeal and op-
pression by fitting her story within a legal narrative of "victim." The
narrative imposes the costs of a further loss of individual power and self-
esteem and compounds the trauma of having to identify a "perpetrator"
narratives with new, though less offensive, universalized narratives. See ELIZABETH V. SPEL-
MAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988);
Rhode, "'No-IPoblem," supra note 42, at 1790 ("Feminism has increasingly become 'femi-
nisms,' which complicates the search for theoretical coherence and political cohesion.").
45. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 43 ("Recognizing law as a discourse calls attention
to how law establishes regulations, thoughts, and behavior and institutes expectations of what
is legitimate and illegitimate behavior, what is acceptable,... what is rational and irrational,
what is natural and unnatural."); MACKINNON, supra note 33, at 238 ("Through legal media-
tion, male dominance is made to seem a feature of life, not a one-sided construct imposed by
force for the advantage of a dominant group.").
Norms and values supposedly upheld by a legal narrative, however, often do not become
accepted reality. This is especially true with respect to antidiscrimination doctrine. See, ag.,
Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimina-
tion Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 139-44 (1989)
(analyzing discrimination doctrine's inability to restructure the workplace); Sylvia A. Law,
"Girls Can't Be Plumbers"--Affirmative Action for Women in Construction: Beyond Goals and
Quotas, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 45, 57 (1989) (observing blatant, systematic noncompli-
ance with legal norm of equality in construction employment sector).
46. See Goldfarb, supra note 33, at 1634-36; Heather Ruth Wishnik, To Question Every-
thing: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64 (1985).
47. I focus on these two parts of the story typology in Parts II and III, infra.
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who has imposed his will. The necessity of playing the role of victim is
most pronounced in cases involving sexual violence.48
In her study of the New Bedford, Massachusetts gang rape trial,
Kristin Bumiller analyzes the roles of the media, prosecution, and de-
fense in constructing and reconstructing the complainant. 49 In studying
the woman's testimony at trial, Bumiller observes "how [the woman's]
speech in [the] courtroom both conform[ed] to legal ways of understand-
ing violence and yet embodie[d] resistance to accepted modes of expres-
sion."' 50 A trial within a trial occurred, in which the woman was re-
attacked by the defense lawyers who attempted to prove that she did not
possess the qualities of victimization required by the legal narrative of
rape.51 Defense lawyers tried to show that she did not possess the moral
qualities of innocence, good-judgment, consistency, sobriety, responsibil-
ity, and fidelity. Consequently, the defense focused on the following
"facts": The woman had been drinking at the time of the attaclq the
attack occurred late at night in a tavern; the woman was single but lived
48. People who suffer from any form of discrimination are required to play this role. The
harm caused by the role may be greater than the harm to be remedied. As Joel Handler puts
it:
Under antidiscrimination law, a person must acknowledge that she has been victim-
ized, but these people are reluctant to take on this role.... To claim victimhood
publicly threatens their sense of control, a self-identity that has allowed them to
cope. In addition, they fear the law and power of their opponents and believe that
they will ultimately fail to be vindicated.
Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle" The Interpretation of Entitlements,
Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899, 960 (1990)
[hereinafter Handler, Political Spectacle].
Universalized narratives also have the effect of denying that there are any victims at all.
As Catharine MacKinnon asserts: "Rape law assumes that consent to sex is as real for women
as it is for men. Privacy law assumes that women in private have the same privacy men do.
Obscenity law assumes that women are already socially equal to men." MACKINNON, supra
note 33, at 169.
49. Kristin Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Wlomen in
Legal Culture, in BOUNDARIEs, supra note 39, at 95.
50. Id. at 96.
51. Compare the requisite of victimization in rape cases with traditional self-defense doc-
trine requiring "equal force" in response to grave and imminent bodily threat. See, e.g., Eliza-
beth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 606-07 (1986) (analyzing case in which a Native American
woman shot a white male, and the trial court refused to account for her perspective as a Native
American woman). Under potentially contradictory universalized narratives in the criminal
law, a woman must demonstrate the qualities of "victim" after suffering a sexual attack, limit
her actions during an attack to those deemed "reasonable," and once the attack is over must
refrain from taking any physical actions against her attacker. For a discussion of the problems
of male bias in the criminal justice system in the context of homicidal crimes, see Laura E.
Reece, Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right to Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 53 (1991).
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with the father of her two children; earlier in the evening she had ignored
her girlfriend's advice to "go home"; she could not remember how many
men actually raped her or what she had said immediately after the inci-
dent.52 In what amounted to victimizing the victim, the judicial process
held the woman up to the universalized narrative of rape, and then made
her accountable for her inability and unwillingness to fit that narrative. 53
Legal narratives of victim are related to other narratives subordi-
nately inscribed in legal discourse, such as those written in the connected
and overlapping areas of family and work. Legal narratives of family
and work are premised on two seemingly fundamental principles: (1)
there is a normal or natural division of labor based on gender in both the
workplace and the family; and (2) family roles are private while employ-
ment sector roles are public.54 Concepts of gender and the distinction
between private and public privatize women's family responsibilities and
devalue the work women do in the marketplace."5
52. Bumiller, supra note 49, at 101-07. In addition to rape, women are victimized by acts
of incest, sexual harassment, pornography, and prostitution. When the experience is one of
physical force, women are more apt to fit the legal narrative of victim. When the experience is
one of economic or authoritative, but not physically violent, coercion, it is more difficult for a
woman to fit her story into the required legal narrative and show harm. Cf MACKINNON,
supra note 33, at 113 (arguing that rape, incest, sexual harassment, pornography, and prostitu-
tion are primarily sexual abuses of women, not just expressions of physical coercion).
53. The narrative of victim pervades most official accounts of encounters between those
who have power and those who do not. Rhode, "No-Problem," supra note 42, at 1775-77.
Official accounts justifying violence against disempowered people often include the rhetoric of
"victim responsibility." See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 142. See generally KRISTIN BUMIL-
LER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICriMS (1988). The
focus on the victim rather than society's pathologies is prevalent in poverty law and is the
essence of the worthy/unworthy distinction that determines who is granted assistance and who
is denied it. See Lucie White, Representing "The Real Deal " 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 278, 298-
99 (1990-91) [hereinafter White, "The Real Deal']; infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
54. Private/public distinctions designate boundaries within many universalized narra-
tives beyond which the law will not intrude. See David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 243 (1984). A fundamental assumption in liberal legalism, the private/public
distinction defines the world and orders the way people relate to one another and the state in
their daily lives. What is "private" is deemed irrelevant and insignificant within legal narra-
tives: "When the line between public and private is crossed, [legal] community concern for the
outcomes produced by social life ceases because those outcomes are conceived as merely the
result of private choice." Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction
in American Law and Life, 36 Burr. L. REv. 237, 243 (1987). Like all boundaries within legal
narratives, the private/public distinction "can be turned inside out precisely because it has no
logical content at all." Id at 248.
55. The work/family and private/public distinctions are characteristic of societies fo-
cused on commercial production. See Linda Gordon, Family Violence, Feminism, and Social
Control, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE, supra note 36, at 178, 194; Gwendolyn
Mink, The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race, and the Origins of the American Welfare State,
in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE, supra note 36, at 94-95. The conceptual separation
of work and home in capitalism has generated a male standard of productivity and indepen-
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The woman's role is as primary care giver in the family and secon-
dary breadwinner in the workplace. This is not merely a complementary
division of equal tasks; it is a patriarchal division valuing the market over
the family, thereby ensuring male dominance even in the primarily fe-
male sphere of the family.5 6 In turn, the workplace structure presumes
and requires a worker with a nonprimary care giver family role, imposing
on women the sometimes impossible burden of accommodating work and
family responsibilities. Universalized narratives of women in the family
"form underneath" and act as a foundation for legal doctrines and rules
pertaining to family law, employment, property, commerce, education,
and welfare,57 while defining and reenforcing social functions and
experiences.5 8
dence, and a male image of a female standard based on servility and economic dependence.
See Mink, supra, at 94-96. Eli Zaretsky makes the point that both patriarchal and capitalist
ideologies are based on the illusion that there is a private sphere where private life takes place
protected from hostile outside forces. ELI ZARETSKY, CAPITALISM, THE FAMILY, AND PER-
SONAL LIFE (1976). Public/private role distinctions become especially tenuous and strained
when legal narratives attempt to deal with sexual relations in the marketplace and economic
relations in the family.
56. Dowd, supra note 45, at 117, 132-33; see also CLARE BURTON, SUBORDINATION:
FEMINISM AND SOCIAL THEORY 33-56 (1985) (subordination of women based on their con-
finement to the domestic sphere, whether or not they labor in the market); Rhode, "No-Prob-
lem," supra note 42, at 1746-50 (subordination of women in family and society based on
conservative religious and sociobiological premises). The private/public distinction between
family and market has a negative bearing on the rights of women. See, eg., Ruth Colker,
Pornography and Privacy: Towards the Development of a Group Based Theory for Sex Based
Intrusions of Privacy, 1 LAW & INEQ. 191 (1983) (arguing that women stand to lose more than
gain from traditional private/public distinction). For example, reproductive choice is con-
ceived within legal narratives as a "private right," isolating individual women with private
burdens of pregnancy, birth, abortion, and child care. The legal narrative of private choice
excludes public demands for community assistance. See Freeman & Mensch, supra note 54, at
239-40. Similarly, the private/public distinction protects acts of greed, competition, and ac-
quisition, legitimizing gross disparities in wealth between men and women as the natural prod-
uct of free will and private choice. See id. at 246.
57. Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows" Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 819-20.
58. Universalized legal narratives of family and work are thus critical for understanding
legal narratives about women on welfare. See infra Section I.D.; see also Deborah Maranville,
Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on Unemployment Compensation Benefits
and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1992) (case study revealing how unemployment
compensation system based on male head-of-household worker discriminates against women).
The construction of the family-gender roles, child rearing, and socialization-are
integral parts of this political economy, as are race and ethnicity. Thus, poverty
policy is influenced by and, in turn, influences labor discipline, gender and family
roles, socialization, and race and ethnicity. All are part of the ideological construc-
tion of welfare policy.
Handler, Political Spectacle, supra note 48, at 906. Handler argues that in the nineteenth cen-
tury a domestic code developed in which the role of women became firmly entrenched in the
private family. The code had serious consequences for poor mothers who had no alternatives
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Because men and women today are publicly considered equals, lib-
eral family law focuses on equal rights between marriage partners. Ex-
amples of this "equal treatment" are most prominent, however, at the
end of the legal relationship of marriage in the way property and children
are distributed among the "equal" former marriage partners. 59 But there
is "a problem with treating men and women as the same in divorce when
the social expectations that have defined their life in marriage have not
done so." 6
For example, the new equality-based doctrines of child custody ig-
nore the underlying and pervasive inequalities in the market and society
at large. In recent years, the presumption of maternal custody for the
most part has been replaced by the doctrine of "best interests of the
child" and joint custody. 61 It is now no longer assumed that childrearing
is solely the woman's responsibility. The reversal of that assumption
may be laudable from an equality perspective.62 Upon application, how-
ever, the new "gender neutral" equality-based factors upon which child
custody decisions are based, such as economic status and lifestyle, may
not fairly adjudge the experience of some women.
At first glance, joint custody seems like the ideal solution for equally
distributing childcare responsibilities after a marriage ends. With the
possible benefits, however, can come heavy costs. Men may use the
threat of joint custody as a bargaining tool to avoid or reduce child and
spousal support or to decrease the woman's share of marital property.
Furthermore, in joint custody arrangements, the woman is typically the
residential parent with day-to-day burdens and responsibilities, while the
to work: they were condemned for working and blamed for increasing labor competition. Id.
at 906-08. Today, this dilemma for poor mothers is reflected in contradictions within AFDC
policies and regulations. See infra Section I.D.
59. See Martha Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules of Distri-
bution of Property at Divorce, in BOUNDARIES, supra note 39, at 265. For analyses of divorce
law and divorce reform, see LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, THE UN-
EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); DIVORCE RE-
FORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990); June
Canbot & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change,
and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953 (1991).
60. EISENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 69.
61. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD:
PROFESSIONAL BOUNDARIES (1986) (discussing the roles of parents and professionals in child
custody disputes).
62. Compare Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 59, at 6, 35 (rejecting primary caretaker
child custody presumption as inherently sex-biased) with Jane W. Ellis, Surveying the Terrain:
A Review Essay of Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, 44 STAN. L. REV. 471, 472-73 (1992)
(failure to consider factor of primary caretaker may operate to the detriment of children).
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man retains effective veto authority over the woman's decisions. For the
woman, this can cause insecurity, a reduction in autonomy, or even more
severe problems if the man is a former or current batterer or abuser.63
In a recent article, Christine Littleton recounts a story that demon-
strates how supposedly equal and neutral custody criteria such as length
of residence and economic status have negative effects on women.64 A
woman who had sole physical custody of her son was twice thwarted in
her attempts to move out of state for family and career reasons by her ex-
husband (who had joint legal custody) and by a family court judge. The
woman later received her ex-husband's permission to relocate within the
state to take advantage of a career opportunity, and the two worked out a
three week/one week custodial arrangement. After the son reached
school age, the court declared that the son's residence had to be in his
father's home county to enable the boy to attend a single school during
the year. The court's order forced the woman to leave her new job and
move back to her ex-husband's home town in order to maintain primary
custody. The court, in effect, perceived the woman as the one disrupting
the status quo because it was she who had moved away from the site of
the marriage. It mattered little to the court that the woman had always
been the primary custodial parent; however, it did matter that her ex-
husband maintained a thriving ten-year-old business whereas she was be-
ginning a new career. In essence, the fact of the divorce had little bearing
on the traditional narrative of the wife following the husband for his con-
venience and for the "good" of the family.
This story demonstrates how child custody factors such as economic
status and parental lifestyle place many women in a conundrum. Di-
vorce law's conceptual severance of family and market leads courts to
undervalue women's noncommercial contributions to the home and to
63. See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Depen-
dency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 20 (1986); Joane Schulman & Valerie Pitt,
Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Wo-
men and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539, 554-56 (1982).
This dilemma is compounded for women who receive AFDC. AFDC recipients are re-
quired to cooperate in child support enforcement actions under the Title IV-D Child Support
Enforcement program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 652-659 (1988). A common tactic of men attempting to
evade child support responsibilities is to counterclaim or threaten to counterclaim for joint
custody or increased visitation. The woman may have no choice but to accept this risk and
endure such threats since she is required by AFDC laws to participate in enforcement actions
and to testify against the child's father if necessary. See Amy E. Hirsch, Income Deeming in
the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 713, 721-25 (1987-88).
64. Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk about "Women"?, I UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 37-51 (1991) [hereinafter Littleton, "Women'] (feminist analysis of Fingert
v. Fingert, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1575, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1990)).
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overlook gender inequalities in the workplace.65 If a woman emphasizes
her economic independence in the story she tells to a family law judge,
she may fall prey to a suspicion that she does not have time to be a "good
mother" or primary custodian because she works full time, while her
husband still may be the greater wage earner and enjoy a higher eco-
nomic status. She thus loses on both factors. If, on the other hand, she
emphasizes her time and commitment to take care of her children, she
will have to admit dependency on her ex-husband's resources to make a
"suitable" home.66 Because the law pushes women to choose one of two
opposing narratives, a woman may be forced to narrate her story in a
way that contradicts her experience and perspective. To claim she is
both breadwinner and caregiver may cast doubt on her rationality; under
the law, it seems, a woman cannot be all things at once.
As breadwinners in the marketplace, women are forced to contend
with the difference in the range of occupational choice and employment
status between men and women. The limit in occupational choice arises
from perceived work/family responsibility conflicts and their impact
upon employee roles, which are defined in relation to the male standard.
Work/family conflicts are in large measure structural features that result
from facially neutral policies and rules.67 Research shows that the differ-
ence in employment status is the consequence of gender bias resulting in
systemic patterns of undervaluation, rather than quantifiable differences
arising from conflicting family roles.68 These structural features of
65. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS,
supra note 59, at 191, 193.
66. Economic discrimination and double standards as to what makes a good mother and
what makes a good father are reasons that women today often lose litigated child custody
battles. Eg., National Center on Women and Family Law, Sex and Economic Discrimination
in Child Custody Awards, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1130, 1130-34 (1983). A recent study
shows that in hotly contested custody disputes, women receive sole custody only 46.2% of the
time. See Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What CustodialArrangements
are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 59, at 37, 54.
Women also may fare no better in child custody mediation due to a rigid orthodoxy about
appropriate conduct and what may be said in the mediation setting. See Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). In both fam-
ily court and mediation women who are not prepared to give, or who simply cannot give, one
hundred percent to their children may be considered undeserving mothers, while men who are
prepared to give only a little may be perceived as deserving fathers. See Littleton, "Women,"
supra note 64, at 43 (citing PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL 50 (1986)).
67. See Dowd, supra note 45, at 114; Fineman, supra note 59, at 136; see also Mary Joe
Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1059-62 (1992) (discussing legal rules which "maternalize" women by encouraging their
family roles while discouraging their market roles).
68. See Rhode, "No-Problem," supra note 42, at 1757-59 (summarizing criticism of
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choice and status are present in, and legitimized by, universalized legal
narratives of work.
In EEOC v. Sears69 the court examined sex segregation in the work-
place and interpreted it as free choice. Vicki Schultz persuasively argues
that the court in Sears merely followed legal narratives about women in
the workforce by viewing the absence of women in commission sales as a
reflection of women's lack of interest.70 Schultz identifies two distinct
narratives flowing through judicial interpretations of employment law
doctrine: the "conservative story of choice" and the "liberal story of
coercion." 71
In conservative judgment stories jobs are gendered. Nontraditional
women's blue-collar work is described in terms such as "hot," "heavy,"
"dirty," and "physically demanding," and thus "unattractive" and
"unappealing" to women. "Once the court describe[s] the work in reified
masculine terms, women's lack of interest follow[s] merely as a matter of
'common sense.'"72 Nontraditional women's white-collar work is de-
scribed in social and psychological terms, with courts invoking the uni-
versalized narrative of the woman's role in the family as evidencing a
social cause for women choosing lower paying positions.73 Once the
court invokes the narrative of the woman's private role in the family, her
preference for a complementary role in the workplace is "logical." 74
Unlike the conservative narrative, the liberal one attempts to sup-
press differences in work preferences between men and women. The lib-
eral narrative rejects the conservative assumption that connects private
family roles to the preference for public work roles. Instead, it invokes
the image of the woman as victim-the modem woman who is looking
for nontraditional work but is irrationally rejected in an otherwise non-
discriminatory labor market despite her individual qualifications.75 By
human capital theories, under which women meet competing job and family demands by mak-
ing a lower career investment).
69. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. IM. 1986), af#'d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
70. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work- Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argumen4 103
HARV. L. REv. 1750, 1754 (1990).
71. Id. at 1800, 1806. Deborah Rhode notes that the two opposing narratives result from
the perceived need to provide simple causal explanations for complex employment patterns.
See Rhode, "No-Problem, " supra note 42, at 1769.
72. Schultz, supra note 70, at 1801-02 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 1802-03.
74. E.g., Gillespie v. Board of Educ., 528 F. Supp. 433, 437 (E.D. Ark. 1981), affid on
other grounds, 692 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1982), cited in Schultz, supra note 70, at 1803.
75. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market" A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. Rav. 1497, 1547 (1983) (discussing the phenomenon of sex-blind dis-
crimination and its effect upon women in the marketplace).
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casting individual women as isolated victims, the liberal story presents
plaintiffs as workers unaffected by familial responsibilities or aspirations.
Further, it presents defendant employers as independent actors unaf-
fected by deeper social processes that actively shape women's aspirations
in the workplace. 76 The liberal antidiscrimination narrative of victim
thus ignores social constructions of gender and the resultant work/family
role conflicts women often do face.
Universalized legal narratives of victim, work, and family impede
and constrain the stories that can be heard in legal fora. Moreover, legal
narratives also have a direct, everyday impact on the lives of the poor. I
now turn to explore the ways in which the law both shapes and controls
the everyday lives of disempowered people who must constantly confront
and conform to its dominating presence.
C. Power Over Storylines of the Poor
Universalized legal narratives script the storylines of poor people-
their past, present, and future-by influencing their self-perceptions and
controlling their lives. Positive manifestations of legal narratives-rules,
regulations, and laws-shape the way poor people live, prescribing and
deterring actions through law's presence, absence, and application. 77
Legal principles and categories affect how people define their problems
and whether they perceive those problems as disputes involving compet-
ing claims or rights. Even when perceiving a dispute as involving a legal
problem, disempowered people-who are most likely to suffer injustice-
are least likely to seek legal redress. Self-blame coupled with an accurate
perception of the trauma of invoking legal processes often deters those
who may need legal assistance the most.78 Additionally, many poor peo-
76. Dowd, supra note 45, at 1809-11.
77. For a classic study of how welfare law controls the lives of the poor, see FRANCES
Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR (1971). See also MIMI
ABRAMOV1TZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM CO-
LONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 313-52 (1988) (discussing how welfare programs affect the
daily lives of poor women). The understanding that law acts both directly and indirectly on
people's lives, prescribing consequences even through its absence, is a fundamental principle of
legal realism. Eg., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11-12
(1927).
78. See JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION 24-25 (1986); Bumiller, supra
note 49; White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 22, at 21. The fear of claiming also derives from the
treatment of the disempowered as less than autonomous subjects. When coming into contact
with state authority, disempowered people have been, and still are, made objects of interven-
tions that override their interests as they define them. See Heller, supra note 30, at 184; see
also infra Section III.A. (traditional lawyer practice is to override client perspective and pur-
pose and transform client story into one that fits lawyer perception of legal narrative and
harm).
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ple, aware of their own financial, social, and perhaps physical and mental
vulnerabilities, may not be willing or able to enter into the new depen-
dent relationships necessary to put forth a legal claim.79
The unwillingness of disempowered people to take action on their
legal claims or rights is particularly troubling given that many, if not
most, aspects of poor people's lives are affected and constrained by public
policy, as enacted and enforced through statutes, rules, and regulations.
There is a connection between the hesitancy of disempowered people to
assert their claims in authoritative arenas and the control law has over
their lives. Because public policy is a reflection of pervasive and domi-
nant preferences, attitudes, and values, the claims of those who are
subordinate or marginalized are likely to perish upon contact with the
legal system.80 In order to have their claims considered, the dis-
empowered often must adopt (or pretend to adopt) dominant values and
attitudes. When they refuse to enlist legal assistance or conform their
stories to dominant values and expectations, their narratives remain un-
heard and their perspectives go unrevealed.81
Rules and regulations controlling poor people are tailored toward
bureaucratic administration of their lives in the form of legal entitle-
ments. What is regulated-food purchases, housing space, medical treat-
ment-is "embedded in the context of... life-histor[ies] and... concrete
way[s] of life; it has to be subjected to violent abstraction not merely
because it has to be subsumed under the law but in order that it can be
handled administratively. '8 2 Assistance is granted to those deemed to be
worthy-a determination based on universalized narratives and catego-
ries that act as proxies of moral worth and need.
The line dividing the worthy from the unworthy poor (which deter-
mines how much and what kind of assistance, if any, the state will grant)
is based on attributes that justify public support and protection on the
one side, public indifference and sanction on the other. 83 Formal catego-
ries of deservedness generally include the disabled, blind, and elderly.
79. Cf Handler, Dependent People, supra note 27, at 1082 (noting reluctance of elderly
poor to enter into community care health programs due to their multiple vulnerabilities).
80. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, Public Policy and Disabled Infants: A Sociopolitical Perspec-
tive, 3 IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 14-15 (1987) (negative attitudinal environment of disabled people
is reenforced by public policies that historically have allowed disabled persons to perish).
8 1. For law reform to take place, the narrative perspective and purpose of poor people
must be revealed to legal decisionmakers. See infra Section III.D.
82. Habermas, supra note 15, at 203, 210. As bureaucratic social regulation, welfare is a
part of the political economy and the federal system. Tensions, ambiguities, and contradic-
tions within welfare regulation of the poor are both caused by and played out in each of these
systems. See Handler, Political Spectacle, supra note 48, at 939-43.
83. The worthy/unworthy distinction draws a line between those who are respectable
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Formal categories of undeservedness generally include nonworking "em-
ployable" single people and heads of households. 84 Many of the pre-
sumptively undeserving are single black mothers, and race in conjunction
with gender plays a defining, although unofficial, role in state assistance
decisions. "[Pleople will greet [ ] black femaleness as unreliable, untrust-
worthy, hostile, angry, powerless, irrational and probably destitute. '8 5
Those whom the state deems undeserving must work or comply with
directives in order to receive any assistance.
For example, homeless persons desiring public assistance must com-
ply with strict regulations that have the dual purpose of control and
treatment. Failure to comply with the regulations leads to withdrawal of
assistance. If forced back out on the streets, the homeless face further
state regulation and harassment for undertaking private acts deemed im-
proper in public.86 Cities have enacted regulations specifically to pro-
hibit the homeless from undertaking daily survival activities such as
sleeping, washing, urinating, defecating, and begging in public spaces, the
only areas the homeless-by definition-can be. This policy of contain-
ment is an attempt to make public spaces as uninhabitable for the home-
less as possible with, for example, fewer and fewer public toilets, barrel-
and those who are not. See generally MICHAEL B. KATz, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM
THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989).
84. Traditionally, the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor women has
been drawn in terms of their relations to men. Widows are deserving, while abandoned or
unmarried mothers are undeserving or at least suspect. Linda Gordon, The New Feminist
Scholarship on the Welfare State, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE, supra note 36, at 18
[hereinafter Gordon, The Welfare State].
85. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 147; see also Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and
Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992) (exploring narratives
of the bad or unfit mother in law and literature).
86. To receive shelter in New York City, for example, homeless persons must accept
assignment to segregated shelters that divide the homeless according to "population types"
such as the employed, mentally ill, aged, disabled, drug or alcohol dependent, children, and
veterans. CITY OF N. Y. HUMAN RESOURCES ADMIN., SEGMENTATION AND ASSIGNMENT
TO SHELTER 1-3, 11, 19 (1988) (on file with author) (guide for city social service agencies
drafted in pursuance of five year plan for housing and assisting homeless). Under the segmen-
tation system, assignment is mandatory; refusing assignment results in forfeiture of shelter. Id.
at 11.
Although this regulated system may enhance administrative ease and control as well as
some residents' safety and comfort, a strict program of segmentation and regulation treats
people according to universalized dependency characteristics in a manner that may further
destabilize their homeless condition. Due to the oppressive physical and regulatory conditions
of shelters, many homeless persons find they have no choice but to seek alternative forms of
shelter and assistance. See, eg., COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, A FALSE SENSE: A STUDY
OF SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES IN NEW YORK CITY'S MUNICIPAL SHELTERS FOR MEN 47
(1989); Gary L. Blasi, Litigation on Behalf ofthe Homeless: Systemic Approaches, 31 J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 137, 141 (1987).
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shaped subway seats to prevent sleeping, refuse containers protected by
locks and spikes, and park sprinklers turned on at random times during
the night.87 Law's power over homeless persons is pervasive: it denies
them the most basic acts of subsistence thereby denying them their basic
dignity and freedom. 88
Because of law's inherent ambiguities and contradictions, individu-
als administering rules and regulations retain powers of discretion, inter-
pretation, and most importantly, action. 9 Drawing upon organizational
theory, Joel Handler has observed that public assistance administrators
wield great power and control over recipients and applicants because of
their monopoly over benefits distribution.90 They can use their power to
select recipients who satisfy their biases and serve their ideological and
professional interests. Individual perceptions, framed by bureaucratic
practice, are critical to an applicant's prospects. Those who do not
demonstrate required characteristics of dependency or worth may be re-
jected, terminated, or allowed to wander the bureaucratic procedural
maze.91 The higher an applicant's or recipient's adjudged social worth
and prospects for rehabilitation, the more likely aid will be forthcoming
and sustained, and the more likely a welfare bureaucrat or caseworker
will consider the poor person her client and go out of her way to provide
help.9
2
Welfare state interventions in the individual lives of the poor pro-
duce many contradictions. For example, to receive assistance, prospec-
tive grantees must engage in required expressions of dependence,
whether true or not. Stereotypical images within universalized narratives
of the poor cause the subjects of those narratives to assume-in order to
fit the narrative and put forth an acceptable claim-what for many are
87. Mike Davis, Afterword-A Logic Like Hell's: Being Homeless in Los Angeles, 39
UCLA L. REV. 325, 329-31 (1991).
88. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295,
301, 318-21 (1991).
89. The power of action is especially critical for those who are participating in entitle-
ment programs. Because many aspects of their spending and consumption are regulated by
welfare rules and requirements, recipients are in perpetual contact with representatives at
lower levels of welfare bureaucracy to deal with problems and changes that occur in daily life.
Without an empathic and available contact (generally a caseworker), the regulated life of a
recipient becomes even more frustrating and tangled.
90. Handler, Dependent People, supra note 27, at 1050-56; cf infra Section II.A. (discuss-
ing lawyer's power of "triage" in deciding whether poor client's case will be accepted).
91. Joel Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The
Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 524-32
(1987-88) [hereinafter Handler, Transformation ofAFDC] (case study of Los Angeles' General
Relief process).
92. See Handler, Dependent People, supra note 27, at 1054-56.
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false characteristics of those images. Some conform their lives to the
state-designated mode of dependence; others publicly falsify their private
situations to meet the state's requirements. 93 Those who are given assist-
ance are told exactly what and how much they need. As prescribed
treatment by bureaucratic experts, welfare often seems to contradict the
professed aim of state assistance-the promotion of self-reliance and in-
dependence. Instead of complementing the individual and complex con-
texts of recipients' lives, welfare regulations control, shape, and formalize
the lives of recipients. 94
In conforming their behavior to dominant assumptions and images,
the poor adopt an instrumentalist strategy in order to gain access to re-
sources or assistance that would otherwise be denied. When a poor per-
son refuses to play her assigned role or manifest ascribed traits, she
"expresses a subtle critique of those stereotypes" by communicating her
individuality in the oppressive context of daily survival.95 When she
plays the role, her aim is to please, to avoid confrontation, and thereby to
make the best of a bad situation. 96 The specific legal conditions under
which state assistance will be granted and subsequently extended pres-
sure her to redefine herself and her relationships.
Women receiving AFDC generally must define themselves as single
mothers who live alone and depend on the state to provide their children
with the means for subsistence. Thus, publicly the father of the children
may be reported unknown or absent, while privately he may be present
on a daily basis. Publicly the woman must show she cannot provide a
good home for her children without the grace of the state, though pri-
vately she may be independent, resourceful, and exhibit the strength nec-
essary to keep her family together and provided for.97 The tension
93. "There is always resistance on the part of the poor. They have to survive. They
struggle to assert themselves, to claim benefits; they try to manipulate the system. [They]
experience in their daily lives the contradictions and injustices of the dominant discourse."
Handler, Political Spectacle, supra note 48, at 937.
94. Habermas, supra note 15, at 216-17.
95. White, "The Real Deal," supra note 53, at 308.
96. Handler, Dependent People, supra note 27, at 1059 (quoting KATHY E. FERGUSON,
THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 98 (1984)).
97. I do not intend to imply that single women on welfare have some special power or
trait that gives them inherent independence or control. My claim is simply that most poor
women have the ability to adapt to circumstances in order to survive and care for their fami-
lies. Nor do I adopt the myth of "Black Matriarchy" in my focus on welfare mothers in the
Section that follows. The image of the powerful Black matriarch was created and sustained by
white men in a racially tainted attempt to explain a social situation for which they had great
use but no real understanding or experience. See BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN 51-86
(1981). Such images contribute to the contradictions I explore below.
April 1992]
between private realities and public pretenses and requirements forms the
core of state welfare contradictions.
D. "Welfare Mother" Contradictions: The Stories of Poor Women
Most Americans think of women-single mothers-when they think
of welfare. Nevertheless, when experts, and especially scholars, have
examined welfare they have either described it as an ungendered pro-
gram or as if the sex of those involved in it made no difference.98
"Welfare mother" contradictions arise primarily from ambivalence
about public support for nonworking single mothers. They are apparent
in programs that offer or condition assistance without regard to what
"mother" means; they are manifest in "work for welfare" programs that
attempt to prepare recipients for work in a labor market that may pay
less than the welfare benefit. These contradictions are expressed in social
values and commitments: a single mother's dependence on the state is
decried, while a wife's dependency on her husband is not; wealthy mar-
ried mothers take opportunities to stay home with children, while poor
single mothers are forced to work to decrease their dependency on the
state. Private dependence is seen as natural, while public dependence is
seen as suspect and a drain on the fisc. When poor mothers do not or
cannot work, they are subject to government "entitlement" programs
that require them to exhaust all resources before applying and then keep
them in poverty with subsistence level benefits administered through a
stigmatizing and humiliating system.99
"Work for welfare" approaches to mothers' dependency on the state
are based on the "male pauper" model derived from the poor laws of
England, which presupposed that the poor were poor solely because they
did not work. Under the pauper model, the solution to poverty and the
way to get freeloaders off the rolls is to force them to work. The model is
based on a universalized narrative of the able-bodied white male. Con-
temporary advocates of the model generally ignore concrete realities of
what it means to be a poor single mother in the workplace: prevalent
race and sex discrimination in the labor market; sole responsibility for
children even while at work; the need for supplementary training and
98. Gordon, The Welfare State, supra note 84, at 9. From a public policy perspective,
this blindness to recipient needs is troubling, given that the number of poor households main-
tained by unmarried women has been dramatically increasing, while the number of poor
households maintained by single men or married couples has been decreasing. See, e.g., Diana
Pearce, Welfare Is not for Women: Why the War on Poverty Cannot Conquer the Feminization
of Poverty, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE, supra note 36, at 265, 265 & n.3 (citing
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY, INCOME, AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND
PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1988 (1989)).
99. Gordon, The Welfare State, supra note 84, at 14-19; Pearce, supra note 98, at 271.
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education; and needs such as health insurance, day care, and a flexible
work schedule. 10° Under the work for welfare rationale, poor mothers
must choose between low paying, unrewarding jobs that limit time for
family care and development, and continued unemployment and depen-
dency. "Either choice perpetuates her poverty, both of income and of
life." 10'
The tension between private choices and public assistance require-
ments can be seen in a welfare reform effort, the Family Support Act of
1988 (FSA or Act). 10 2 FSA's primary emphasis is on work rather than
income level and family well-being.103 Supporters of the Act hope it will
make single mothers self-sufficient. They focus on a universalized narra-
tive of dependency; their goal is to treat and cure.'°4 Some critics of the
Act assert that it is based on a dominant vision that equates "indepen-
dence" with a job, and that it will force poor single mothers to relinquish
primary, daily care of their children for low-paying jobs and inadequate
childcare. They focus on a universalized narrative of motherhood; their
goal is to give poor mothers a choice of whether to work or not.105 As
Johanna Brenner notes, these competing narratives ignore the possibility
of promoting women's independence as individuals while supporting
them as mothers.'0 6
The centerpiece of the FSA is the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
Program (JOBS) which must be operational in every state by October
1992. In the state run JOBS programs, AFDC recipients will receive an
assessment of their work skills and then may participate in a wide range
of training, education, and work-related activities. The end goal, of
course, is to move mothers off of welfare and into permanent jobs. Those
100. See Pearce, supra note 98, at 269-70.
101. Id at 275.
102. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 11-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
103. The 1988 "reform" did not increase either funding levels or government incentives
for welfare recipients to prefer work over government aid. Rules governing the relationship
between recipient earnings, eligibility, and benefit levels still do not provide incentives for
mothers to work outside the home. Budgeting rules do not allow full deductions for actual
child care costs, nor do they prevent a nearly dollar for dollar loss in benefits due to work-
related expenses. See Mark Greenberg, Federal Welfare Reform in Light of the California
Experience: Early Lessons for State Implementation of the JOBS Program, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 419, 424-26, 471 (1989-90).
104. See, ag., S. REP. No. 377, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1988) (reform "designed to help
applicants and recipients of cash assistance avoid long-term welfare dependence through edu-
cation, employment, and training services"), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776, 2801.
105. Jrohanna Brenner, Towards a Feminist Perspective on Welfare Reform, 2 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 99, 99-102 (1989).
106. Id. at 125-29. Brenner calls the competing perspectives a conflict between a "politics
of equality" and a "politics of difference." Id. at 102.
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who receive jobs are eligible for "transitional" child care assistance and
medical care coverage. 10 7
JOBS is a comprehensive "work for welfare" program reflecting a
social bargain struck between liberals and conservatives: welfare
mothers will have to work under the supervision and command of the
state; the state will provide education, training, job placement, day care,
and health insurance to make mothers' participation both possible and
meaningful and to ensure their ultimate independence. 10  Thus, in re-
turn for AFDC recipients' labor, the state is to provide various supports
and opportunities. This reform consensus was forged out of a frustration
over seemingly open-ended entitlements, a feeling that welfare without
strings attached encourages dependency in mothers, which is passed on
to their children, and a belief that in tough economic times citizens ought
to contribute and not just receive.109
Joel Handler has identified five broad themes running through the
Act: responsibility, work, family, education, and state discretion.' 10
Although the five themes sound sensible enough, the universalized narra-
tive on which they rest is based on stereotypes and assumptions: jobs are
available for those willing to take them, but welfare enables recipients of
government largesse to maintain high standards about what jobs are ac-
ceptable. This understanding comports with the male pauper narrative
and focuses on individual character flaws rather than structural
conditions. 111
Thus, although the provisions of the FSA are infused with the reha-
bilitative purposes of personal development, independence, and responsi-
bility, the rehabilitative rhetoric is contradicted by increased
discretionary control and regulation of recipients' personal lives and their
families. 1 2 Without adequate funding and wholehearted implementa-
tion by the states-not mandated by the FSA-the JOBS work require-
ment may burden poor mothers without guaranteeing them necessary
supports and opportunities.' 13
107. For a fuller description of the JOBS program, see Greenberg, supra note 103, at 432-
44.
108. See Handler, Transformation of AFDC supra note 91, at 463.
109. See id. at 466-67.
110. Id. at 506.
111. Id. at 489, 509.
112. See id. at 466-67.
113. See id. at 520; Greenberg, supra note 103, at 441; Paul Taylor, Moynihan Urges
Training for Welfare Recipients, Bill Offered as Challenge to Administration, WASH. POST,
Feb. 29, 1992, at A14 (noting that "welfare dependency" has been a focus of resentment in
1992 presidential election campaign, but that states have used only 75% of available federal
funds for JOBS program).
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For example, in the JOBS program states have sweeping discretion
to decide who must participate in the program ("workfare"), and who is
allowed to participate in the program. 114 Failure to participate when
commanded to do so will result in serious sanctions; failure of the state to
provide adequate education and job opportunities under the Act may
prove difficult to challenge. 115 By allowing states to exercise virtually
unbridled discretion, the Act invites bureaucratic application of univer-
salized narratives regarding the worthy and unworthy poor to individual
program decisions. The likely result:
The overwhelming majority of recipients will somehow be shunted out
of the system. They will be declared "inappropriate for referral" or
put on hold, and the bureaucrats will go on as before. Faced with
fewer policy options because of reduced funding, agency staff will
either have to try to force recipients into unpleasant choices or impose
sanctions. 116
A welfare work program that purports to provide supports and op-
portunities for poor mothers (and hence a better life and opportunities
for their children), but which in operation cannot guarantee beneficial
choices (and hence autonomy), is contradictory to the professed goals of
family support and independence.
114. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(E)(i) (1988) (state required to provide learning pro-
gram only if "State resources otherwise permit" and custodial parent has not yet completed
high school); id. § 602(a)(19)(F)(iv) (state determines what amount of day care and transporta-
tion costs are necessary and eligible for federal reimbursement); id § 602(g)(l)(A)(i)-(ii) (each
state must "guarantee" child care, but only to extent determined by state); id § 682(b)(1)(A)
& (B) (state must make individualized "employability plan" for each participant based on
assessment of prior work experience and skills as well as on educational, child care, and other
needs; such plan need only reflect preferences of participant "to the maximum extent possi-
ble"); id. § 682(e)(2)(C) (state may adjust standard of need in "work supplementation pro-
gram" based on state's determination of what is necessary); id § 682(e)(3)(B) (state determines
who may participate in work supplementation program); ia. § 684(a)(4) (in assigning partici-
pants in work program and in providing support services state need only ensure conditions of
participation are "reasonable"); Greenberg, supra note 103, at 439-41, 444 (although JOBS
requires states to implement certain programs, there are no resource, participation, or quality
of services requirements); Handler, Transformation of AFDC, supra note 91, at 502-06, 515-16
(under FSA states retain discretion to decide who will participate, and Act's waiver and option
policies give local programs incentive to reduce costs by requiring work without providing full
supports and opportunities possible, but not required, under Act).
115. Greenberg, supra note 103, at 432-42. "There have always been many more volun-
teers, even among the so-called hard to employ, than slots and jobs [under work for welfare
programs]." Handler, Transformation of AFDC, supra note 91, at 516.
116. Handler, Transformation of AFDC, supra note 91, at 518. For an assessment of what
is necessary to turn the "paper success" of the FSA into reality, see id. at 516-18. On story-
telling possibilities and imperatives under a welfare system dominated by individual discretion,
see infra Section IV.C.
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The FSA's structure and requirements are an example of law's per-
vasive regulation and dominance over poor mothers' lives. 117 Lucie
White identifies three themes of this pervasive legal control: intimida-
tion-the fear that assistance may be terminated at any time, preventing
the initiation of any actions which might displease the regulators; humili-
ation-the stigma of receiving welfare and being dependent, causing a
lack of confidence to assert claims and make defenses; and objectifica-
tion-the position of being a categorical recipient and having others or-
dain what is required and relevant.' 18 The fear and intimidation lies not
just in the threat of having assistance cut off, but also in having children
removed by the state on the ground that their mothers can no longer
meet state-imposed standards of care.1 19 Poor mothers may be placed in
a catch-22 situation: desiring to call on the state for assistance for their
children but dreading to do so for fear of calling attention to their impov-
erishment. The resulting contradiction is that the intimidation, humilia-
tion, and objectification suffered by women receiving welfare may cause
them to take actions least conducive to eventual independence from the
state. Instead of holding out for educational opportunity and a good sta-
ble job, they may be forced to turn back to an abusive or unreliable male
supporter or to accept a bad or unsafe job with low pay and no opportu-
nity for advancement.
Despite the public control over their lives, there is evidence that wo-
men on welfare retain private dignity in their daily struggle to survive. A
117. The extent of control and regulation is determined in part by the type of assistance
awarded. In-kind benefits, rather than cash assistance, give the state maximum control over
recipient behavior. Gender often plays a role in policy decisions regarding which form of
assistance is granted. See Brenner, supra note 105, at 105.
118. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 22, at 32-44.
119. See, eg., Gordon, The Welfare State, supra note 84, at 189 (child protection regula-
tions make poor women vulnerable by calling into question the quality of their mothering);
Stanley S. Herr, Children Without Homes: Rights to Education and to Family Stability, 45 U.
MIAMI L. Rnv. 337, 359-60 (1990-91) (homeless mothers avoid contacting state welfare agen-
cies for assistance out of fear of having children removed to more "stable" foster care); Hirsch,
supra note 63, at 733-34 (problems arising from financial vulnerability create risk of state
charges of neglect).
Marie Ashe retells the biblical story of King Solomon, in which two unnamed women
("harlots") and their competing claims of being the one true mother of a baby are brought
before the King. By invoking the dual power of word and sword, Solomon decides which is
the true mother-the one who unselfishly gives up her claim rather than allow the King to
divide the baby in two. Marie Ashe, Abortion of Narrative: A Reading of the Judgment of
Solomon, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 83 (1991) (quoting I Kings 3:16-28 (King James)).
Ashe asks, what if the other woman, the one who refused to give up her claim, was the true
mother? "What if she was misjudged? The question strikes us almost as unthinkable." Id. at
88. Like the state today, Solomon had the power to decide the fate of two women and a child
by transforming complex relationships and claims into simple, certain, absolute choices.
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large part of that struggle is exerted in unrecognized work as facilitators
in the welfare economy.
[W]elfare clients must work to collect their entitlements, and women
do a disproportionate amount of this work .... Medical aid, aid for
the disabled, programs for children with special needs, indeed educa-
tional institutions altogether assume that women will be available to
make it possible for the aid to be delivered: to drive, to care, to be at
home for visits, to come to welfare offices. 120
On occasion women speak out about the frustration, indignation,
and humiliation they must endure in their struggle as welfare
facilitators. 121 But usually they do not; for in order to protect themselves
in their interaction with the welfare state, women learn to play the
subordinate role the state expects, and perhaps even demands. That as-
signed role perpetuates their subordination, transmuting characteristics
such as caring, accommodation, and altruism into evidence of depen-
dency requiring alleviation through state assistance. 122
Frances Fox Piven points out that despite the domination and con-
trol of welfare regulations and bureaucratic processes, welfare can pro-
vide an opportunity for women to exercise power and autonomy absent
from dependent relationships with men.123 This reverse contradiction
highlights the weak position of women in the family and the market and
suggests that the limited protection women receive from their state enti-
tlements helps to offset their deteriorating private and economic status.
State entitlements reduce fears that mothers and their children will go
hungry and homeless if the mother gets fired, quits her job, or ends a
private dependent relationship to escape abuse or neglect. Thus, individ-
ual and collective acts of speaking out may not be the hopeless expres-
120. Gordon, The Welfare State, supra note 84, at 12-13.
121. See, eg., Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2114-18 (re-
counting dignity, caring, community, and rights narratives of Mrs. Celeste in her story of food
stamp reduction); Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 619, 633-39 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn] (re-
telling story of Josephine V. and her demand to speak out at fair hearing regarding hardship
caused by bureaucratic delay in adding baby to income maintenance budget); White, Sunday
Shoes, supra note 22, at 30-31, 48 (retelling story of Mrs. G and affirmation of personhood in
her talk of Sunday shoes in AFDC hearing). See generally DIGNITY (Fran L. Buss ed., 1985)
(compilation of narratives of impoverished women and their struggles for survival while main-
taining dignity).
122. Handler, Dependent People, supra note 27, at 1059; see also White, Sunday Shoes,
supra note 22, at 14-19 (summarizing rhetorical survival skills of women subordinated within
system of welfare bureaucracy).
123. Frances Fox Piven, Ideology and the State: Women, Power, and the Welfare State, in
WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE, supra note 36, at 250.
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sions of helpless people; they may be the demands of people who believe
both in their rights and in their ability to assert those rights.124
Women on welfare living in the same housing project or on the same
block, or in related but physically distinct households, also engage in
private collective actions of mutual self-help. Network help arrange-
ments provide shared meals, transportation, child care, clothing, cash,
and food stamps for getting through daily struggles or specific emergen-
cies. 125 Because of this reliance on community assistance, administrative
relocation of women on welfare that separates them from established
help networks is particularly damaging, though typically ignored or
overlooked by both bureaucratic experts and poverty lawyers.1 26 In the
next Part, I reflect on some of the reasons why poverty lawyers often fail
to observe such details in their clients' lives and stories.
I. Receiving Client Stories
For the poverty lawyer pressed for time and resources, the poor cli-
ent is often but a fie number or case name. Except for the immediate
events leading up to the client's legal problem, the lawyer typically does
not inquire about the client's life and history. Entanglement with the
details of poor clients' lives is perceived as too costly in terms of time and
energy, outside the lawyer's role, and an impediment to the lawyer's job.
As a result, the poverty lawyer may not comprehend the relevance of the
narratives that compose the stories of poor clients' lives.
A. The Storytelling Setting
Poor clients come to poverty lawyers because they have no other
choice.12 7 Although there are mutual trust problems in any attorney-
124. Id at 258; see Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2117-18
(recounting Mrs. Celeste's faith in and invocation of rights); Sarat, supra note 5, at 346 (poor
people retain power to respond to welfare state intransigence and injustice); infra Section
II.B.(2) ("rights talk" of poor clients).
125. See CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLAcK
COMMUNITY 90-107 (1974); Fraser, supra note 36, at 215-16; see, e.g., Alfieri, Speaking Out of
Turn, supra note 121, at 640-41 (recounting how Josephine V. turned to community of family
and friends when welfare fell below level necessary to meet needs of herself and baby).
126. Cf Pearce, supra note 98, at 273 (geographic isolation of poor single mothers in hous-
ing projects and segregated communities limits employment opportunities of women and edu-
cational opportunities of their children).
127. Corporate and other paying clients often utilize lawyers and the law as means to
increase their own welfare or to defeat like-minded people who are attempting to do the same
at their expense. Corporate clients typically go to their law firm saying, "I want to do this, tell
me how." In contrast, poor clients go to a legal services office asking, "This is what they are
doing to me, what can I do?"
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client relationship, 12 the indigent client is placed in a particularly vul-
nerable position: on the one hand, she has no choice but to place her
trust in the legal services office; on the other hand, the legal services office
looks and acts suspiciously like the welfare bureaucracies in which the
client likely has become entangled. 129
At the legal services office, the poor client typically stands in line,
receives a number, fills out forms, waits in a crowded reception area, and
deals with several levels of personnel before talking to a decisionmaker (if
she talks to one at all). She is asked a standard set of background ques-
tions that may only scratch the surface of her story and problem and may
be given little opportunity to expand on her answers or respond with her
own questions. 130 The core of the relationship, if established, is lawyer
control and client compliance, lawyer dominance and client
subordination.
Prospective poor clients are often screened out and sent away
through the process of "triage," a method of case selection necessitated
by resource and time scarcity.131 In triage only the "best" cases or most
worthy clients are selected. Practitioners and scholars have attempted to
construct a principled method of client selection, given resource con-
straints. 132 These attempts focus on normative dilemmas and efficiency
concerns of the lawyer; consideration is rarely given to the effects on the
128. See Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEo. L.J.
1015 (1981). Burt points out an intrinsic disharmony of interest between the lawyer and pay-
ing client-as the client's trouble and woe increase, so too does the lawyer's potential enrich-
ment. Id at 1021. A similar disharmony exists in the poverty law context; the worse the
situation is to the client, the "better" the case may be for the reform-minded poverty lawyer.
129. See Sarat, supra note 5 (recounting stories of poor people in search of legal assist-
ance); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practic 37
UCLA L. REv. 1101, 1104-1110 (1990) [hereinafter Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based
Ethic] (discussing phenomenology of legal services practice as "street-level bureaucracy").
130. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2111-13 (detailing
interaction in legal services office).
131. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic, supra note 129, at 1104 ("[Tlriage [is]
a practice of distinguishing among several clients in determining which should receive what
level of service, acknowledging that each cannot receive an unlimited delivery of service.").
132. See, eg., Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scar-
city and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337 (1978) (offering justification
for case, issue, and client selection and denial based on norms and principles in Model Code of
Professional Responsibility); Marshall J. Breger, LegalAid for the Poor: A ConceptualAnalysis,
60 N.C. L. REv. 281 (1982) (advocating neutral selection criteria for choosing clients regard-
less of perceived comparative utility of cases); Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic,
supra note 129 (arguing for "community-based" selection criteria grounded in lawyer's percep-
tion of values and needs of pool of clients served); see also Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawy-
ering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947 (1992)
(advocating future oriented approach to poverty law practice that sacrifices "short-term" gains
for individual clients in favor of "long-term" benefits for communities of disempowered peo-
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lawyer-client relation and how "triage mentality" influences both lawyer
and client perceptions of the client's problem and the issues at stake.1 33
Although the lawyer may feel some connection with clients who meet the
law office's definition of "worthy"-most likely based on community
norms as determined by the law office-satisfaction with the value of
cases is different than understanding poor clients' stories and therefore
their needs.134
Triage is made possible by the dominant/subordinate positions of
the poverty lawyer and her poor client. Both the prospective client and
the lawyer understand that the client can give the lawyer no material
compensation for time and resources. This grants the lawyer total con-
trol over the initiation, duration, and direction of the lawyer-client rela-
tion; it also stands in contrast to the power position of the paying client
who comes to a lawyer willing and able to pay for legal assistance. The
prospect of monetary exchange encourages the lawyer to hear the pro-
spective client's entire story before deciding whether to take the case.
The relationship between the client's money and the lawyer's willingness
to listen provides at least a partial balance of power at the initiation of
the relationship.
In traditional poverty law practice, answers to a standard set of pre-
liminary questions usually determine whether prospective clients have
claims meriting the legal staff's time and energy. A client's failure to give
the right answers, or her insistence on telling her story in a manner in-
consistent with the question and answer pattern, may result in her being
turned away as hostile or uncooperative. 135 If accepted, a client is sub-
jected to second-order triage: she is classified as a case-type and contin-
ues to compete with other clients for scarce time and office resources. If
the lawyer determines that a new case is more urgent or poses a greater
threat to higher values, a client may be "reallocated" or "deprioritized."
It is in this setting that the client attempts to tell her story.
B. Client Narrative
A poor client's visit to the legal aid office is but one moment in her
life history-a history composed of an unfolding chain of stories that
pie; and analogizing from literature of bioethics to commence discussion regarding distributive
justice and resource allocation decisionmaking in poverty law contexts).
133. An exception is Tony Alfieri's reconstruction and analysis of the case of Mrs. Celeste,
a former client. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14.
134. See Naomi Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992) [hereinafter
Cahn, Styles of Lawyering]
135. For a detailed study of the perspectives of poor clients and their experiences with
poverty lawyers, see Sarat, supra note 5.
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may be retold through a series of interconnected narratives. In telling
her story, a client speaks in a narrative form that draws upon past events
and experiences embedded in other stories composing the text of that
client's life. The story the client attempts to tell the lawyer has a plot
already configured and characters already cast. Although the whole of
the client's story might not seem rational, or legally relevant to the law-
yer, to the client the story is organic, if not certain and logical.1 36
(1) Elements of the Client's Story
The narrative perspective from which the client tells her story is
grounded in an amalgamation of experiences and multiple identities.
"[R]ealities experienced by [a] subject are not in any way transcendent or
representational, but rather particular and fluctuating, constituted within
a complex set of social contexts." 137 A client's social context includes
various overlapping roles and identities. For example, a client who walks
into a legal services office might be: impoverished, African-American, a
single mother, a food stamp recipient, a run-down tenement resident.
Attached to each role and identity are interwoven experiences and en-
counters which compose that client's subjective essence. The narrative
perspective through which she tells her story draws upon images and
experiences contextualizing the events surrounding the legal problem and
connecting them to other events in her life.
The client has come to the legal services office because she has iden-
tified (or someone has convinced her that there is) some type of legal
problem involved in her story-a problem she believes is addressable by a
lawyer.1 38 The legal problem precipitating the visit to the lawyer's office
could be a child welfare agency's attempt to place a child in foster care, a
food stamp reduction, a denial of AFDC, or an eviction notice. Because
the legal problem is not an isolated event, the story the client tells about
the problem necessarily intersperses narrative material drawn from each
role and identity of the client's life, giving meaning and context to the
legal problem.
136. Thomas L. Shaffer, Christian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics, 33 MERCER
L. REv. 877, 886 (1982).
137. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. Rlv. 829, 877-78
(1990).
138. But cf Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 22, at 2482 ("[The client's]
inability to speak the language of the law prevents her from knowing her experience as a legal
event.") (emphasis in original). While the client may not know if she has a good case or claim
before talking to the lawyer, her act of coming to the lawyer must be because she has some
sense that she needs to invoke "the law," whatever it may be.
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The legal problem is an outward manifestation of an interaction,
relationship, or brief encounter that became a dispute. The dispute is a
social construction built from the relative social positions of the client
and the person or authority with whom the dispute has arisen. 139 The
origins of the dispute are traceable to events occurring prior to the notice
of eviction, entitlement reduction or denial, or hearing notice. The be-
ginning of the story is not the point where the dispute became unresolv-
able. Lawyers, recognizing this, conduct interviews with clients about
past communications and interactions.
In focusing the interview on the legal problem, however, the lawyer
may elicit a story from the client that imposes an artificial beginning,
middle, and ending on the client's narrative of the dispute. The begin-
ning of the story from the client's perspective may lie well before the
point of contact with the welfare agency or landlord. Instead, the natu-
ral narrative beginning might be a job loss, departing spouse, fire at a
previous apartment, or numerous and frustrating attempts to communi-
cate with an uncaring or uncomprehending caseworker. How the lawyer
elicits the client's story will influence what story the lawyer hears, which
in turn will prescribe the legal strategy chosen and the form and effect of
any legal remedy obtained.140
The legal strategy chosen by the lawyer focuses on possible remedies
for the client's injury or prospective harm. The lawyer's understanding of
the client's injury is derived from the story the client tells during inter-
viewing sessions. Bent on extracting the most efficient account of the
client's story, the lawyer hurriedly moves the client along her narrative
stream, stopping to glean bits of information about the legal problem,
casting away narrative "static" about aspects of the client's life the law-
yer perceives as immaterial.141 The lawyer typically understands the cli-
ent's injury or prospective harm to be what traditional legal remedies
might cure. Although the client went to the law office looking for legal
assistance, the client's injury or prospective harm-from the client's per-
139. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 631, 631-33 (1980-81).
140. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. R.v. 2073, 2094
(1989); infra Section II.C.
141. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law & Social Relations: Vocabu-
laries of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'y R v. 737, 742 (1988) [herein-
after Sarat & Felstiner, Law & Social Relations] (describing how divorce lawyers ignore clients'
attempt to explain marriage failure because interpretations about what happened are irrelevant
to legal task of dissolving marriage).
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spective-may be far more complex than simply a denial of benefits or
the prospect of eviction.1 42
(2) Rights Talk
Like most clients, poor clients attempt to tell their stories to lawyers
in order to persuade them that they are in the right and the other side is
in the wrong. Understanding their public disempowerment, poor clients
speak the language of rights as a way to make claims against others and
to convince themselves of the rightness of their claims. 143 Realizing their
dependency on the lawyer and sensing (or being informed of) the poverty
law office's triage structure and mentality, poor clients use the language
of rights to make pleas for lawyer attention, time, and commitment. The
"rights talk" of clients has the potential for providing a common ground
(if not a common language) for communication and can infuse lawyer-
client conversation with a dialectic quality. 144
When poor clients make public claims, they tell stories about the
unjustness of the injury they have suffered (or may suffer) arising from
the deprivation of fundamental needs such as housing, food, security, ed-
ucation, or respect. Not all need deprivations can be transformed into
formally cognizable constitutional, statutory, or common-law rights
claims. Only needs or interests whose satisfaction is secured by a corre-
sponding duty of others are rights in the formal legal sense.145 But any
142. See, e.g., Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 121, at 643 (statement of client in
administrative hearing describing indignation and frustration she suffered at hands of income
maintenance workers who ignored requests for additional assistance, failed to provide informa-
tion regarding possible emergency assistance, and put her through numerous hardships as a
result of rude and uncaring treatment); Clark D. Cunningham, Representation as Text: To-
wards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, The Lawyer as Translator, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
(forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator] (manuscript at 31-
35, on file with author) (statement of African-American client explaining that his real injury
was assault on dignity and honor committed by white police officers who arrested him on
charge of disorderly conduct); Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 22, at 2466-67,
2492 (insistence of inmate client that his case was about fundamental unfairness of prison
disciplinary system and not about procedural violations during disciplinary action taken
against him); Sarat & Felstiner, Law & Social Relations, supra note 141, at 764 (indicating that
clients of divorce lawyers have strong need for moral vindication as well as no fault
settlement).
143. See Sylvia Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK.
L. REv. 805, 816-17 (1990) [hereinafter Law, Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly] (poor clients
like rights more than "fairness" and "empathy" because of their fixed nature); Minow, Inter-
preting Rights, supra note 13, at 1867. Rights claims of poor clients are often demands for
respect, dignified treatment, or the simple right to know. See Sarat, supra note 5, at 359-65.
144. Handler, Dependent People, supra note 27, at 1096; cf White, Sunday Shoes, supra
note 22, at 46 (lawyer talk of rights and justice may offer client vindication as well as remedy).
145. Ulrich K. Preuss, The Concept of Rights and the Welfare State, in DILEMMAS OF
LA.V IN THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 15, at 151, 156. Characteristic of the modern
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claim phrased in the language of rights is grounded intuitively in at least
two perceptions. The first is that the deprivation is an unjust constraint
on a personal and legitimate interest; the second is that the claim out-
weighs any counterclaim. In recognizing that a dispute may involve a
legal problem and in coming to the legal services office for help, clients
exhibit a belief that what is being done to them (the injury) is wrong and
that they have claims to assert in defense. The substance of the connec-
tion the client makes between her perspective, the dispute, the legal prob-
lem, her injury, and her rights is the narrative material of the client's
claiming story.
"Rights" have a dual character and meaning. The first is the tradi-
tional judicial reading of socially and politically recognized claims
backed by the threat of state coercion: a recognized claim brings state
intervention on the claimant's behalf. This first meaning of rights iso-
lates and identifies rights claims as counterposed and competing. A valid
claim is one that can be abstracted and fit into an authoritative legal
category that places a demand for action upon the state or another.
Critics of rights have argued that the diversion of claims or compet-
ing interests into abstract categories of rights serves two useful purposes
for the powerful: diffusion of social discontent into theoretically or doc-
trinally based conflicts (thereby impeding social movements and social
progress); and legitimization of indeterminate dispute outcomes. 146 Be-
cause rights are believed to be at the core of both social and individual-
state relations, individuals tend to view their interactions with others and
the state as enabled by and contingent upon the existence of rights. 147
Rights thus mediate direct interpersonal connections, impede construc-
tive dialogue, and promote alienation by acting as impersonal channels
for action. 148 Critical scholars have exposed the resulting liberal "myth"
welfare state are "distributive rights." Such rights differ from other types of rights because
they interfere with the unregulated allocation of goods and services in society and protect the
less powerful from the more powerful through government intervention. Id at 163.
146. E.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363 (1984).
147. Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the With-
drawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1576-77 (1984). This is a version of the classicist view of
rights, which equates rights with immunities rather than privileges. See, e.g., William H. Si-
mon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv. 1 (1985) [hereinafter
Simon, Invention and Reinvention].
148. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLrr-
ICAL DISCOURSE (1991). Martha Minow has observed that, in his opinions Justice Powell
treated rights as "defining and accentuating the distances between people" and as creating
"conflict and adversarial relations between" claimants. MINOW, supra note 40, at 290 (citing
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)). The invocation of rights,
however, is evidence of conflict, not the cause of it. Id at 292-93.
Under the traditional liberal vision of rights as protecting the individual against abuses of
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about rights: to seek community redress, one first must secure state rec-
ognition of a right. Only then is a petition for redress considered valid,
and only then is harm remedied through enforcement of the secured
right. The result is a linkage between individual action, conflict, rights,
litigation, and remedy. 149 The critical account of rights is thus one of
universalized legal narratives. It is an account of how law constitutes
roles and shapes the way people view their relationships with each other
and the state. 150 It is also an account whereby lawyers, constrained by
legal doctrine and principles, must fit client struggles and claims into
established categories that are based upon abstracted past experiences.
The problem, however, is not that rights discourse is constricting; it
is that the discourse takes place in a restricted universe.1 51 Rights critics
are as amiss as liberal positivists for failing to incorporate the uncon-
strained, everyday meaning of rights grasped by disempowered clients
who walk into the offices of poverty lawyers. This second meaning of
rights is more tentative and colloquial, and is referred to spontaneously,
often far away from legal institutions.1 52 There, rights are assertions ex-
pressing self-definition and affirmation connecting individual claimants
to the larger community and society.1 53 "For the historically dis-
empowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects
of humanity: rights imply a respect which places one within the referen-
tial range of self and others, which elevates one's status from human
body to social being." 154 The experiential, everyday meaning of rights
encompasses the belief that one should not be abused, mistreated, taken
advantage of, harassed, insulted, or denied access to the means for secur-
ing life's necessities without adequate justification.
the collective, the personal nature of rights isolates disempowered individuals, negating their
right to call on the community for help, and "transform[s] the social reality of poverty into a
believed fantasy about autonomous choice, in which poverty results from individual failure."
Freeman & Mensch, supra note 54, at 239.
149. See Alan Hunt, Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L.
& Soc'y 309, 309 (1990).
150. See supra Section II (discussing composition, consequences, and power of universal-
ized legal narratives).
151. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 159.
152. See MINOW, supra note 40, at 308; Barbara Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Local Set-
tings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1689, 1692 (1989) ("In a culture domi-
nated by a liberal legal ideology of rights, there are many ways in which 'rights' can be used
and understood.").
There are other conceptions of rights that may not fit neatly into the two meanings I have
identified here. See, eg., Winter, supra note 30, at 1214-17 (under "source-path-goal schema,"
legal rights understood in terms of appropriate behaviors designated by law).
153. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 51, at 611, 620-22.
154. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 153.
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In this sense, rights are about actions of real people as they make
their way through life, and are meaningful only when located in lived
experiences. Expressed in the language of poor clients, rights talk com-
municates meaning, purpose, and dissatisfaction, and affirms human
value, dignity, connectedness, and identity. It is this second meaning of
rights that gives normative power to client-asserted stories, a power often
overlooked in the lawyer's rush to identify and isolate legal problems.
By coming to the law office, poor clients express a willingness to
participate in public resolution of their disputes while demanding consid-
eration and justification of detrimental actions taken against them. Their
rights claims are both linked to and dependent on corresponding obliga-
tions and responsibilities of others in the community or society. 155 Be-
cause of this dependence and linkage, rights as claims are to a degree
contestable, indeterminate, unstable, and necessarily contextualized and
dialectic. 15 6 The instability and uncertainty of the client's own percep-
tion of her rights, the context giving rise to her claim, and the best argu-
ment she can muster under the circumstances to persuade others of the
rightness of her position are intertwined components of the narratives
through which the client tells her story.
C. Eliciting and Receiving the Client's Story
When a potential client walks into a poverty lawyer's office, she
brings with her an agenda and perspective different from the lawyer's.
The client may be angry, scared, frustrated; the lawyer hurried, distant,
observational. At the initial interview, the client is uncertain what her
role will be in the interaction that will follow; the lawyer, however, has a
set routine designed to get information from the client necessary to de-
cide whether or not there is a "case." As the client begins to tell her
155. In this respect, rights "articulate a vision of entitlements, of how things might be."
Hunt, supra note 149, at 325-26. This is the motivating force behind the growth of the interna-
tional human rights movement over the last fifty years. See, e.g., Christopher P. Gilkerson,
Human Rights and Refugees in Crisis: An Overview and Introduction, 2 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1
(special issue 1990) (advancing human rights perspective of refugee crises based on perspec-
tives of refugee populations and individuals); Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100
YALE L.J. 1409, 1444-45 (1991) (observing that human rights causes have in common an
upward evaluation of the individual within a more diversified, inclusive community).
156. See Handler, Political Spectacle, supra note 48, at 999-1113; Minow, Interpreting
Rights, supra note 13, at 1867, 1884; Simon, Invention and Reinvention, supra note 147, at 29;
Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 597-615
(1983) (arguing that assertion of rights can lead to social transformation by identifying interre-
lationships between individuals and their communities).
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story, the lawyer joins with the client in an interpretive act that shapes
the form, substance, and meaning of the story told and heard. 157
The method the lawyer employs to elicit the client's story shapes the
story's substance and conclusions. 158 The lawyer-client interpretive in-
teraction defines and redefines their individual perceptions of the legal
problem, dispute, and injury-perceptions shaped by each participant's
expectations and preconceptions of the other.159 The lawyer hears the
story in her own narrative voice, arising from a perspective that is shaped
by legal training and practice, as well as personal bias and history. In
this way the lawyer filters the client's story through her own experiences
and hears a story that may be different from the one the client intends to
tell.160
Part of the lawyer's filter is her knowledge of, and previous en-
counters with, universalized legal narratives. By focusing on the legal
problem, the lawyer selectively hears and amplifies information pertinent
to universalized narratives she believes are implicated by the client's
story. Other aspects of the client's story are seen as irrelevant and are
ignored as static impeding the client's narrative flow. Clark Cunningham
gives one such example. He tells the story of a former client who was
arrested for disorderly conduct after two police officers first stopped him
for running a red light and then frisked him. 161 Cunningham immedi-
ately perceived the encounter as an improper "stop and frisk" that had
escalated into a pretextual arrest. By focusing on the legal problem,
Cunningham circumscribed his advocacy strategy in an effort to best fit
his client's case into a legal narrative of improper search and seizure. 162
Cunningham reports that upon a lengthy reexamination of the case
(prompted by the client's announced dissatisfaction with the way his law-
yers, the judge, and the judicial process had treated him), he found that
157. See, e.g., Edward M. Bruner & Phyllis Gorfain, Dialogic Narration and the Paradoxes
of Masada, in TEXT, PLAY, AND STORY: THE CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF
SELF AND SOCIETY 56, 60, 73-74 (Stuart Plattner ed., 1984) (describing process of "dialogic
narration" in which stories are formed through interaction between teller and listener); Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce
Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1669, n.39 (1989) [hereinafter Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers
and Legal Consciousness] (describing different perspectives and agendas of divorce lawyers and
clients and how their interpretations and interactions are shaped).
158. Cf Bartlett, supra note 137, at 844-45 (discussing way in which legal methods shape
substance and determine outcomes).
159. See Felstiner et al., supra note 139, at 645-47.
160. See Naomi Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 19 (1991)
[hereinafter Cahn, Feminist Litigation].
161. See Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 142.
162. Id. (manuscript at 8-14, 118).
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he had overlooked much in the client's original telling of his story. For
example, Cunningham failed to take full account of his client's narrative
perspective as an African-American determined to receive respectful
treatment when pulled over by white patrolmen in a wealthy white com-
munity at 4:30 in the morning. 163 In fitting the client's story into a nar-
rative of improper search and seizure, Cunningham realized that the best
chance of winning the case was to establish a defense that would succeed
even if the police officers' version of the facts were accepted as true.16
He thus failed to notice details about the dispute between the officers and
his client that tended to demonstrate that the police were lying about the
confrontation and possibly covering up an improper racial motive. 165
By focusing solely on what he perceived to be the legal problem,
Cunningham failed to recognize that the client's perception of his injury
was not the misdemeanor citation for disorderly conduct. Rather, the
injury was the injustice of having his honor and dignity violated. 16 6 As
Cunningham himself puts it, he failed to understand his client's funda-
mental complaint: The troopers had stopped him because he was
Black.167
The above case is an everyday example of the imposition of lawyer
pre-understanding onto client narratives. "Pre-understanding is a
method of social construction" through which the poverty lawyer applies
universalized legal narratives to events and meanings in the client's
story.168 Legal discourse and knowledge focus the lawyer's attention on
one aspect of the client's narration of her story-the legal problem.
Through identification and isolation of the legal problem, the lawyer
commits an interpretive act of naming the client and the harm to be rem-
edied. The law and legal training provide the lawyer with a holistic way
163. Id (manuscript at 101-03).
164. Id (manuscript at 8-9).
165. Such details included how the troopers behaved, how the client felt about the con-
frontation, that the pretext later given by the troopers for stopping the client-running a flash-
ing red light-was never told to the client at the time of the incident, and problems the client
had been having with his clutch which caused the client to be certain that he in fact had come
to a complete stop at the light. Id. (manuscript at 111-12).
166. Id (manuscript at 31-42).
167. Id. (manuscript at 112-15).
168. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2123 (citing PAUL
RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 81, 89-90, 110, 178, 243 (1981)); cf
STANLEY FISH, Consequences, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 32, at 315,
316-17 (describing "local hermeneutics" as standard rules of thumb whose application varies
with contextual circumstances); STANLEY FISH, Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist
Road, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 32, at I (discussing "presupposition"
as element of speaker's interpretation about what he is saying) (quoting RUTH KEMPSON,
PRESUPPOSITION AND THE DELIMITATION OF SEMANTICS (1975)).
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of talking about client events-a discourse-in which semantic categories
define and divide social interactions into legal problems. The client story
the lawyer constructs is an account rendered to fit within universalized
narratives selected from the lawyer's professional knowledge of semantic
categories embodying assumptions and core beliefs.169
Furthermore, the hierarchical relationship between dominant law-
yer and dependent client affects the client's telling of her story. The cli-
ent's narrative is continually halted and reordered as the lawyer
interrupts and questions in order to zero in on the legal problem as de-
fined by the lawyer. It is the lawyer who controls the flow of the story,
devaluing as narrative static details deemed irrelevant. In the lawyer-
client interaction, the lawyer has the power to consign the client to a
singular role, such as food stamp recipient, tenant, or welfare mother,
and to identify the client with an assigned universalized character trait
such as "dependent, .... incapable," "helpless," and "passive. ' 170 It is the
lawyer who names the client, legal problem, and harm to be remedied. 171
In response the client, knowingly dependent on the lawyer, may conform
her story to the one the lawyer is attempting to elicit, and may accept her
assigned role and identity without argument.1 72 Thus the lawyer may
misapprehend what the client wants and needs, and may instrumentally
silence the client's narrative in order to establish a legal problem and
solution (and hence goal) familiar to the lawyer.
In order to recognize what disempowered clients mean, want, and
need, the poverty lawyer must relax her interpretive stance in order to
169. See Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 142, (manuscript at 64) (dis-
cussing "ethnomethodology," a blend of linguistics and ethnography); cf GEERTZ, supra note
17, at 141 ("The pretense of looking at the world through... a one way screen, [of] seeing
others as they really are.., is itself a rhetorical strategy, a mode of persuasion ....").
The connections between narrative, language, and discourse have been studied in the con-
text of other bodies of knowledge as well. See, eg., Suzanne Poirier & Daniel J. Brauner,
Ethics and the Daily Language of Medical Discourse, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug.-Sept.
1988, at 5 (structure of medical case report and biomedical language of diagnosis and treat-
ment constrains and distorts substance and meaning of patient stories).
170. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2127-30 (describing
poverty lawyers' traditional interpretive practices of "marginalization," "subordination," and
"discipline"); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 7 (1990) (discussing law school clinical knowledge as system of categories that assign
subordinate identifying characteristics to clients).
171. See, eg., Merry, supra note 12, at 4 (naming action or event is act of power); Lucie E.
White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56 BROoK. L. Rav. 861,
862 (1990) [hereinafter White, Lawyeringfor the Poor] (poverty lawyers appropriate poor cli-
ents' power to name their own world).
172. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2125 ("The poverty
lawyer lacks the critical distance from pre-understanding to grasp the machinations of client
manufactured dependence.") (footnote omitted).
April 1992] POVERTY LAW NARRATIVES
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
discover client narrative voice. To do so, the lawyer takes account of the
client's narrative perspective in analyzing the legal problem, dispute, and
harm to be remedied. Client narratives hold the power to explain the
client's world. They provide natural contextualization for client stories;
the imposition of law's universalized narratives displaces this contextual-
ization. Receiving the client's story requires discerning individual differ-
ences, identities, and experiences, and accepting her narrative as
"accurate, reasonable and potentially understandable given the conditions
under which [she lives]." 173
There are two requirements for this approach to story reception.
First, the lawyer must leave room in the lawyer-client relation for the
client to develop and present her story in her own narratives-the client
must be given room to speak out in the lawyer's office. Second, the law-
yer must assume a nontraditional interpretive stance, one grounded in
client context and perspective rather than lawyer pre-understanding. 74
Seyla Benhabib calls this interpretive stance the "standpoint of the con-
crete other."175 This relational approach is fundamental to feminist the-
ory and methodology.1 76 It requires consideration of "the other" when
interpreting and eliciting the client's story: What are the class, race, sex,
gender, and ability differences that shape this particular client's perspec-
tive? How have they shaped the client's telling of her story and affected
her experiences, relationships, and perceptions about her legal problem,
173. Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspec-
tives on the Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 27 [hereinafter Littleton,
Perspectives] (emphasis in original).
174. Lawyer pre-understanding cannot be cast away, nor should it be. Its proper place is
in recognizing law's universalized narratives and how they marginalize and subordinate the
client's voice and experience.
175. SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY 340-41 (1986). Part of this interpretive stance is empathic un-
derstanding. As Charles Reich has stated:
[E]mpathy [is] the ability to hear and understand the feelings of others, the capacity
to imagine what it is like to be poor, or black, or a mother on welfare, or a woman
encountering job discrimination. Empathy rests on the ability to recognize and rise
above the "subconscious loyalties" of one's own position and privileges in life.
Charles A. Reich, Law and Consciousness, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 77, 78 (1988) (footnote omit-
ted); see also Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1579-82
(1987) (listing and describing aspects of empathy).
176. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 40, at 173-224 (outlining social relations approach to
law); Bartlett, supra note 137, at 880-87 (describing interpretive stance of "positionality," in
which truth is conceived as situated and partial and individual understanding is based on lim-
ited perspective); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Wlo-
men's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 57 (1985) (because lawyer and client




dispute, and injury? Such an interpretive stance places the lawyer in the
multiple role of empathic receiver, collaborator, and participant in the
telling of the client's story. 177
Creating space in the lawyer-client relation for clients to speak in
their own narratives and for lawyers to assume the client's standpoint
requires lawyer self-discipline and restraint. 178 Narrative dialogue can-
not take place unless the lawyer is conscious of her power over client
storytelling, holds that power in check, and informs the client of what
will be transpiring during their conversations. 179 It requires the mutual
recognition and sharing of interpretive power and local knowledge; it re-
quires consciously putting aside the lawyer's privileged position 80 and
allowing the client to name her experience, pain, injury, and self.181
Once pre-understanding has been held in check and space has been
created for the client, the client's story can be elicited, told, and received
through a dialectic interaction. This vision of practice is of a dynamic
177. In feminist terms it means asking the "woman question" in the context of a particular
client's story. See supra text accompanying note 46; cf Handler, Dependent People, supra note
27, at 1086-87 (describing Rawls' "morality of association" as relationship in which "individu-
als strive to put themselves in the place of others"); see also Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, supra
note 134 (feminine connection in lawyer-client relation requires lawyer to empathize and to
make ways to listen to client rather than imposing pre-understanding).
178. Because the poverty lawyer controls the environment and method of storytelling and
reception, it is up to the lawyer to initiate and sustain such a relation. See Bartlett, supra note
137, at 881-82. Further, "[b]ecause client narratives may be unspoken at the outset of the
advocacy relation, the lawyer must employ an interpretive paradigm which immediately af-
firms client voice and narrative." Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14,
at 2140 (footnote omitted).
179. See Cahn, Feminist Litigation, supra note 160, at 17-18.
180. The lawyer's privileged position is composed of her knowledge of, and practice in,
law's universalized narratives, the informal or unspoken rules and procedures that make up
legal culture, see Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness, supra note 157, at 1670-
84, and the client's subordinate, non-paying status, see supra Section II.A. Given these bases
of lawyer power, a "dissident telling may be seen as an invasion of the establishment position,
every commentary on the authoritative version as a critique." Bruner & Gorfain, supra note
157, at 60.
181. See Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, supra note 160, at 8-12; Cunningham, A Tale
of Two Clients, supra note 22, at 2471-72 (quoting Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About
What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations
of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBS. 599 (1979)); Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 13, at 1902
n.177; White, Lawyeringfor the Poor, supra note 171, at 863-64. As Tony Alfieri points out,
granting the client power in the lawyer-client relationship takes power away from the lawyer
to silence the client and bring familiar order to the relationship. He believes both the lawyer
and client tendency to lapse into traditional dominant/dependent relations may be overcome
by entering into an explicit "collaborative" relationship established at the first interview. Al-
fieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2140-41. Others have written
about the need and possibility of entering into lawyer-client relations consisting of shared vi-
sions and goals. E.g., Gerald L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984); William H.
Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. Rv. 469 (1984).
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and dialogic relation, a flowing and ongoing interaction between lawyer
experience and knowledge and client experience and knowledge. 32 The
goals and method of dialectic interaction are different than the goals and
method of persuasion in everyday conversation. "Its object is to engage
each person at the deepest level .... One's concern is not with what
people generally think but with what one thinks oneself and what the
other thinks."' 83 Within the interaction, both lawyer and client voice
and perspective must be respected. Once the client's narrative perspec-
tive is deemed critical to the client's story, the lawyer can discover the
client's narrative contextualization and illumination of the legal problem.
Practitioners and scholars have pointed to several paths that may
lead to the discovery of client voice and narrative within the client's
story. First, poverty lawyers must recognize that disempowered clients
do not speak the language of lawyers or of the law. The language of poor
clients consists of at least two general forms: private, colloquial language
used in everyday life and in private encounters and conversations; and
public, "subordinate language" used in encounters and conversations
with those who hold some kind of power over the speaker. In the latter
context, disempowered people may employ a subordinated language that
utilizes a "polite" style intended to make connection with the listener.
This style of speaking "hedges" questions, answers, and demands with
intonations, ambiguous phrasings, and tag questions that reenforce the
dominant listener's position.1 84
By not threatening the listener's dominant position, the subordinate
speaker may be protecting her own tenuous position, which could be fur-
ther threatened by provoking the dominant listener. In this respect,
subordinate language is not a natural characteristic of inferiority, but a
necessary rhetorical survival strategy. 18 5 Ultimate expressions of this
strategy may be silence or even complete refusal to seek assistance from
those in positions of authority. In conversation, the strategy may go un-
noticed, since subordinate language may conform to both lawyer pre-
182. See Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 142 (manuscript at 47).
183. James Boyd White, The Ethics ofArgument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modem Lawyer,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 849, 870 (1983) [hereinafter White, The Ethics of Argument]. Dialectic
between lawyer and client can be a type of mutual, if not reciprocal, consciousness-raising.
See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 137, at 863-67. Under appropriate conditions, it can be expanded
into group consciousness-raising leading to group strategies for liberation. See Lucie E. White,
To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv.
699, 760-66 [hereinafter White, Lessons from Driefontein]; see also PAULO FREIRE, THE
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970).
184. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 22, at 14-19 (citing ROBIN T. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE
AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975)).
185. Id. at 45-48.
[Vol. 43HASTINGS LAWV JOURNAL
understanding about client dependency and the universalized legal narra-
tive in which the lawyer attempts to fit the client's story. 186
In addition to recognizing the causes and effects of the subordinate
language through which client narratives are spoken, lawyers must rec-
ognize that they do not speak the language of their clients. The lawyer's
misunderstanding of client language includes the failure to recognize cli-
ent survival strategies, dissimilarities in vocabulary and syntax, and dis-
parities in social knowledge due to class, race, gender, sex, age, and
ability differences. For example, from the traditional lawyer interpretive
stance, the "worst fear is a rambling client."1 87 Although the most re-
cent textbook on the topic of lawyer-client relations recognizes that
"rambling" may actually provide important information, it misses the
simple point that the client is rambling only from the lawyer's
perspective. 188
It also fails to consider that client rambling may signify an attempt
to tell a story despite the lawyer's interruptions and narrow focus on the
legal problem, or that rambling may consist of distinct but intertwined
narratives attempting to explain the complex nexus between the teller's
perspective, dispute, legal problem, and harm. Another way poverty
lawyers may misunderstand their clients is in holding to the prevalent
belief that inconsistency or implausibility in a client's story indicates
fabrication. 189 An inconsistent story may simply reflect the contradic-
tions and falsifications that typically attend a poor client's story and
life. 190
In order to see through client rhetorical survival strategies and to
attempt to comprehend client narratives, Tony Alfieri recommends the
deliberate practice of "metaphor" in which "the lawyer imagines that
events composing client story may signify a double meaning."1 91 The
186. In Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991), Mar Matsuda eloquently analyzes the mean-
ing and effects of the way one speaks. Accent and manner of speech carry the story of one's
history and identity, and deviation from a supposed norm is often seen by those fitting the
norm as representing inferiority. "To tell people they cannot express themselves in the way
that comes naturally to them is to tell them they cannot speak." Id at 1388.
187. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH 246 (1991).
188. See id. at 246-47.
189. See id at 251. I do not mean to imply here that poor clients never lie. There is no
reason, however, to believe that poor clients lie more than rich clients.
190. See, eg., supra Section I.D. (discussing "welfare mother" contradictions).
191. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2138. For the classic
work on metaphor and cognitive process, see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, META-
PHORS WE LIVE By (1980).
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double meaning in client narratives is a kind of "double-voicedness" re-
sulting from "the shifting consciousness which is the daily experience" of
disempowered people. 192 One meaning of a client's story may lie in the
frustrations of dealing with prosaic events, such as benefit terminations.
A deeper meaning, however, may be the client's struggle for dignity,
search for community, and belief in rights in the face of the welfare sys-
tem's blindness, rejection, and oppression.1 93 When the lawyer concen-
trates solely on the former meaning, the client's narration of her story
contextualizing the dispute and harm goes unheard.
Finally, while eliciting the client's story, the lawyer can engage the
client affirmatively to support the expression of client narratives. Posi-
tive dialectic interaction requires collaborating with the client in sorting
out claims and attributing blame,194 recognizing and encouraging the cli-
ent's sense of self-empowerment (the realization that the client has or
should have responsibility and control over the fundamental decisions
affecting her life), 195 and demystifying the role of the lawyer and ac-
knowledging the contradictions and falsities in law and bureaucratic
regulation. 196
To recognize or encourage the articulation of client demands or
needs that may be couched in subordinate or unfamiliar language, the
lawyer can engage poor clients in fights talk that may not entail using the
word "fights" at all. 197 Lawyers who speak from traditionally privileged
positions must become multilingual in rights talk in order-to understand
alternative perspectives. 198  Different people have different conceptions
about what their rights are or should be. Further, poor clients will ex-
press their belief in, and understanding about, their rights in ways differ-
192. Patricia Williams, Response to Marl Matsuda, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 11, 11
(1989).
193. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2141-45.
194. See HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION, supra note 78, at 22-27; Felstiner
et al., supra note 139, at 641.
195. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659, 695-711 (1987-88).
196. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 13, at 376 ("power approach" to law practice requires
demystification of state and professional authority). But cf Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers and
Legal Consciousness, supra note 157, at 1665, 1688 (lawyers demystify law in order to control
clients).
197. See, e.g., Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2117-18 (re-
counting client narrative about rights never using the word "rights").
198. VILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 148. Lucie White has observed that when rights are
ambiguous, the lawyer and client are on more equal interpretive footing. White, Lessons from
Driefontein, supra note 183, at 740. Demystification during rights talk entails talking about
rights as having meaning while acknowledging that the court or the state may not recognize or
enforce them.
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ent from a lawyer who has studied and practiced law. Through positive
dialectic interaction, the lawyer gains the power to translate, rather than
transform, the client's story for an authoritative decisionmaker.
I. Translating Client Stories
On the vision of lawyers' translating, rather than re-presenting, cli-
ent stories, Clark Cunningham has said:
[T]he lawyer as translator ... suggest[s] an image of "speaking for
another" that is not inherently silencing of that other. Rather, to the
contrary, a translator enhances voice, enabling it to be heard and un-
derstood in places where it would otherwise be mute. At the same
time that a translator strives to make a speaker heard and understood,
though, the translator does inevitably change what the speaker says, a
process in which meaning may be both lost and gained. 199
On the failure of lawyers to grasp fully the limits of traditional represen-
tation, Robert Dinerstein has observed:
By seeking to accept currently-constructed legal categories as the sole
basis for determining the viability of the client's story, [lawyers] unwit-
tingly may contribute to the lawyer's and client's too-willing accept-
ance of the status quo. Such an acceptance not only makes legal
reform more difficult, but it also may obscure the degree to which cur-
rent legal categories themselves reflect quite contestable assumptions
about race, gender, and class. 2° °
In this Part, I explore the interconnections between the limits of tradi-
tional representation and the possibilities of the translator approach to
poverty law practice.
A. Traditional Practice: Transforming and Recomposing
In our adversarial legal system, stories are tested against other sto-
ries. To make their stories convincing, lawyers draw favorable compari-
sons to successful (winning) stories previously told by others about
similar situations and actors.201 Such stories are part of a line of prece-
dent that reflects a universalized narrative. Accordingly, traditional law-
yer practice is to fit client stories into set patterns. Like any lawyer, the
poverty lawyer would be remiss not to take any opportunity to serve her
client's interests; she too exploits law's limited openings, trying to
199. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 142 (manuscript at 1-2).
200. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts, supra note 9, at 724.
201. See, ag., William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal
Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 661, 662 (1985); Shaffer,
supra note 136, at 886-87. This legal frame of mind is exhibited by the following questions
commonly heard in law offices and government buildings: "What facts do we need to show in
order to make our legal argument?" "How can we distinguish our case from this unfavorable
one?"
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squeeze clients and their experiences into already accepted narratives.
She tells a prototypical story, one that resonates with dominant values, to
evoke a desired response such as pity, contempt, or admiration.20 2
This method, however, transforms the client's narrative into a story
that best fits the story law tells about a person in the client's general
circumstance and position. 20 3 A standard law reform litigation ap-
proach, the class action lawsuit, can be an extreme example of the "fit"
method. Once reform-minded lawyers find a seemingly pervasive legal
problem, they then go about the business of finding plaintiffs to establish
a class. Prospective clients whose stories do not fit the facts required by
the legal theory of the case are excluded from participation. The poor
client's dependence, in conjunction with the lawyer's skill of fitting client
stories into abstract, universalized narratives, empowers the poverty law-
yer to shape and narrate the client's story to satisfy the lawyer's own law
reform interests or agenda.204 Some forms of feminist litigation are in-
herently client narrative transforming, because the story the lawyer tells
in advocacy fits with the lawyer's political goals and is based upon the
lawyer's and not just the client's experience. 20 5
When a lawyer subordinates a client's perspective of her dispute,
legal problem, and harm-her narrative-the lawyer transforms the cli-
ent's story by recomposing it. In essence, the lawyer fits the client with a
"stock story" or script, which the lawyer then recites to the court. The
script may follow closely a universalized narrative or may manipulate the
universalized narrative in order to advance the lawyer's own interests in
202. See Schlag, supra note 18, at 859-60.
203. This transformation may be effected consciously or unconsciously. In receiving the
client's story, the lawyer may manipulate the telling of the story so that it conforms with the
story the lawyer wants to hear, or the lawyer simply may ignore information and details she
believes are irrelevant to the legal problem as framed by the precedents or principles she sees
implicated. Lawyers also attempt to evoke favorable images of their clients in order to locate
them on the "worthy" side of the worthy/unworthy distinction. See White, "The Real Deal,"
supra note 53, at 301-08.
204. See, e.g., Felstiner et al., supra note 139, at 645-49; Hunt, supra note 149, at 318;
Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1062 (1970); Lucie E.
White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 545 (1987-88) [hereinafter White, Making Space for
Clients].
205. See Cahn, Feminist Litigation, supra note 160, at 12-15. On the activist lawyer's con-
flict between putting forth the best political argument and representing clients' actual posi-
tions, see Ruth Colker, The Practice/Theory Dilemma: Personal Reflections on the Louisiana
Abortion Case, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1992). At the Theoretics of Practice Conference
Nancy Polikoff spoke on role definition problems of such lawyers. Nancy Polikoff, Am I My
Client? A Lesbian Activist Lawyer Represents Gay and Lesbian Activists, Presentation at
Theoretics of Practice Conference (Jan. 31, 1992) (tape on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
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the case.20 6 Because of the disparities of power and knowledge between
lawyer and client, the client usually has no choice but to submit to the
recomposition of her story.
Lucie White's account of her representation of "Mrs. G.' 207 pro-
vides an example of lawyer composing that invokes universalized narra-
tives that subordinate the client as a means to obtain relief. The story of
Mrs. G., however, is also a striking example of the ability of poor clients
to transcend the formal boundaries of the lawyer's script.
Mrs. G. sought legal assistance after receiving a letter from the local
welfare office stating that she had received an overpayment of AFDC
benefits. The welfare office took the position that an insurance award
Mrs. G. had collected and spent after her involvement in a minor car
accident should have been treated as a "lump sum" payment applicable
to Mrs. G.'s budget. The welfare department demanded that she pay
back the sum of the insurance award, despite the fact that Mrs. G. had
obtained approval from her caseworker and an assurance that it would
not affect her AFDC budget.208
Based on these facts and her knowledge of welfare law, White deter-
mined that there were two possible client stories that could be told in an
administrative hearing. The first was the story of estoppel: Mrs. G.'s
reliance on bad advice obtained from her caseworker. The second was
the story of "life necessities," requiring a showing that Mrs. G. had spent
the insurance award on essentials, and thus qualified for a waiver of re-
coupment. 20 9 White gauged that the second story required scripting
Mrs. G. in the role of dependent, helpless, and pitiable, while the first
story scripted Mrs. G. in the role of an accuser, "turning the county into
the object of scrutiny. ' 210 Not comfortable with the implications of the
two stories and somewhat frustrated with her client's ambivalence, White
decided to script parts of both stories for the hearing. 211 At the hearing,
however, Mrs. G. departed from her lawyer's script and asserted in her
own voice and from her own perspective why the "Sunday shoes" she
had bought for her five daughters with the insurance award constituted
206. See, e.g., Delgado, A Plea for Narrative, supra note 10, at 2421 ("[The stock] story
picks and chooses from among the available facts to present a picture of what happened: an
account that justifies the world as it is."); L6pez, supra note 181, at 3 ("To solve a problem
through persuasion of another, we... must understand and manipulate the stock stories the
other person uses in order to tell a plausible and compelling story-one that moves that person
to grant the remedy we want.").
207. See White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 22.
208. Id at 21-25.
209. Id at 27.
210. Id. at 27-28.
211. Id. at 28-30.
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"life necessities" to sustain needs of dignity and self-worth. As White
summarizes: "My lawyer's language couldn't add anything to what she
had said. '21 2 In the case of Mrs. G., the client's narrative emerged in the
hearing despite the lawyer's scripting.
Drawing upon the work of Robert Cover, Tony Alfieri has observed
that suppression of client narratives in lawyer scripting of client stories is
a form of "interpretive violence." 21 3 In the way that legal interpretation
by judges is bound up with the threat and practice of violent deeds by the
state,2 14 so too is client story interpretation by poverty lawyers. Poor
clients typically face terminations of food, shelter, health care, and other
life necessities, and confront assaults on their security, dignity, and iden-
tity. The lawyer may be all that stands between the client and concrete
pain and suffering.215 Furthermore, when lawyers ignore or subordinate
their clients' narratives they may do violence to their clients' normative
values and beliefs. In transforming their clients' narratives and substitut-
ing their own compositions, lawyers engage in an act of story interpreta-
tion that may further disempower and silence.216 The question for the
poverty lawyer is whether instrumentalist and efficiency grounds are suf-
ficient to justify a representative role that adds to the poor client's subju-
gation, or whether there is another approach to practice in which the
strategic goal is to enable clients like Mrs. G. to tell their stories and state
their legal claims in their own narratives.
B. The Storytelling Approach: The Lawyer as Translator
As the client's gatekeeper to legal institutions, the lawyer holds
great power over the telling of the client's story. As advocate and repre-
sentative, the lawyer has the power to reveal or conceal the client's voice
212. Id. at 31. Although Mrs. G. officially "lost" the hearing, the county dropped the case
on grounds of "fairness." Id. at 32.
213. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2118-26.
214. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 16, at 816; Cover, Vio-
lence, supra note 13, at 1607, 1609, 1616-17.
215. See White, Piece-Work, supra note 9.
216. Compare the following statement by Robert Cover:
Legal interpretation may be the act of judges or [others]. Each kind of interpreter
speaks from a distinct institutional location.... But considerations of word, deed,
and role will always be present in some degree. The relationships among these three
considerations are created by the practical, violent context of the practice of legal
interpretation, and therefore constitute the most significant aspect of the legal inter-
pretive process.
Cover, Violence, supra note 13, at 1618. Just as judges of the state are "jurispathic"-empow-
ered with the ability to "kill the diverse legal traditions that compete with the State," id. at
1610, so too are lawyers: they have the power to "kill" client narratives that compete with
their pre-understanding and universalized legal narratives.
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and narrative. Critically examining how universalized narratives con-
strain the stories of the poor and constructively engaging the client in
eliciting and receiving her story opens up new ways of envisioning pov-
erty law advocacy. Lawyering for the poor can be an "activity of gener-
ating narratives that illuminate, create, and reflect normative worlds,
that bring experiences that might otherwise be invisible and silent into
public view."1217 To do so requires telling client stories as illuminated by
client narratives.
Drawing upon the work of James Boyd White,218 Clark Cunning-
ham and others have begun developing the concept of the "lawyer as
translator. '219 White defines translation in the following way:
[Translation is an art of recognition and response, both to another
person and to another language... carr[ying] the translator to a point
between people... where the differences between them can be more
fully seen and more nearly comprehended-differences that enable us
to see in a new way what each one is, or perhaps more properly, differ-
ences in which the meaning and identity of each resides . ... 220
The lawyer as translator strives to recognize and see differences be-
tween her client's story and universalized legal narratives. She does not
ignore those differences as irrelevant to legal strategy, nor does she con-
ceal differences in order to fit the client's story neatly into previously cast
legal arguments. Instead, she attempts to discern how universalized legal
narratives fail to take account of her client's perspective and searches for
opportunities to highlight the law's failure by telling the client's story
through the client's voice and narrative. "By thinking of herself as a
translator, the lawyer becomes aware of how, in the process of represent-
ing a client to others, meaning is created and lost.1221
217. Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism,
99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1914 (1990).
218. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (1990).
219. See Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 142; Cunningham, A Tale of
Two Clients, supra note 22. Cunningham may use the term "translation" more broadly than I
do, and at times seems to use it as a synonym for "interpretation" (and bad interpretation at
that): "this translation [of his client's encounter with the police as a Terry stop] ... caused me
to ignore much of my client's narrative .... " Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra
note 142 (manuscript at 108); see supra text accompanying notes 161-167.
220. WHITE, supra note 218, at 230. White has been criticized for failing to account for
and engage critical scholars who are currently writing about and exploring perspectivity and
contextualization. See Sanford Levinson, Conversing about Justice, 100 YALE L.J. 1855, 1873-
75 (1991). This Article is one attempt to engage and integrate various strands of critical litera-
ture in the application of the translation concept.
221. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 22, at 2491. The translation ap-
proach to lawyering exemplifies a feminist "social relations" approach to law: categories, fixed
status, and ascribed traits are suspect; assumptions underlying assignments of difference are
challenged; and it is presumed that the "name of difference is produced by those with the
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"Translation" captures a cognitive approach to law as a human ac-
tivity grounded in experience and imagination; its promise lies in the op-
portunity to change the underlying experiences in which meaning is
grounded.222 Under the translation vision, the lawyer as storyteller is
directed by the client's experience as viewed through the client's narra-
tive perspective. 223 The lawyer-translator's task is to reveal her client's
narrative despite the distortion of legal language and procedure through
which the story must be told during advocacy. This requires the lawyer
to have equal knowledge of law's discourse and rituals on the one hand,
and the client's language, meanings, and values on the other.224 The cli-
ent's narrative goal, expressed in the telling of her story, may not always
be attained through traditional measures of success. "Winning the case"
is not always what disempowered clients want and need-how the cli-
ent's story is told and how the client's harm is named may be more im-
portant. The lawyer as translator needs to accept that litigation failure
may result paradoxically in representational success. 225
While the lawyer speaks for the client, the goal of translation is not
for lawyer and client to "speak with one voice."'226 Rather, the goal is for
power to name and the power to treat themselves as the norm." MNOW, supra note 40, at
110-11.
222. See Winter, supra note 30, at 1112, 1230.
223. "[N]o narrative version can be independent of a particular teller... we may assume
that every narrative version has been constructed in accord with some set of purposes or inter-
ests." Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories, in ON NARRATIVE,
supra note 14, at 209, 215, quoted in Ross, supra note 16, at 383, n.11.
224. See WHITE, supra note 218, at 260-62; White, Making Space for Clients, supra note
204, at 542-46. There are difficulties inherent in this dual responsibility, given that the law
may not have an appropriate vocabulary for the client's experience, and because the use of
different language changes the meaning of that experience. The reduction or ignorance of
different experiences, however, is the fundamental barrier raised by universalized legal narra-
tives. The lawyer's goal is to expose, not succumb to, this difficulty. "[T]he work [of the
translator] becomes more challenging as the social and cultural distance between the client and
society's elites becomes greater." Id. at 544.
225. See, eg., Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 22, at 2492 (observing that
client was more interested in how case was argued than in attaining favorable outcome); Hunt,
supra note 149, at 320 (noting that transformative litigation may be propelled forward despite
litigation setbacks); cf. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 142, (manuscript at
101-04) (discussing how attorney goal of winning case based on legal narrative of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure conflicted with client's purpose in asserting demand for respect
and dignity).
226. Contra Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 22, at 2461. As Tony Alfieri
points out, such mutuality of perspective and identity is not truly possible given the multiple
differences between poverty lawyer and poor client. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Prac-
tice, supra note 14, at 2140-41. Furthermore, lawyer-client identification may not be desirable
from the client's perspective, given the inherently dominant/dependent nature of the lawyer-
client relationship and the lawyer's power to impute client goals.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
POVERTY LAW NARRATIVES
the lawyer to position227 the client's voice within the legal proceeding, to
evoke rather than re-present the client's narratives.228 The lawyer as
translator also does not act as mere intermediary between the client and
the legal system. Instead, the lawyer acts as facilitator, one who enables
dialogue across lines of social difference between the client, law, and legal
decisionmaker. As translator, the lawyer abandons her formal role at
strategic moments in order to establish connection and understanding
between clients and decisionmakers by confronting the latter as human
beings susceptible to enlightenment.229 Although the lawyer as transla-
tor may be a useful metaphor for all types of lawyering, it is an impera-
tive for poverty law practice. As Lucie White has stated: "The gap
between what poor people want to say and what the law wants to hear
often seems enormous. ' 230 The job of poverty lawyers should be to fll
that gap.
When the universalized narrative does not fit, when there is a gap or
contradiction revealed by the client's story, the lawyer has a choice: to
give in to the universalization or challenge it. A challenge requires not
only critique and resistance, but also holding the state and the law ac-
countable by offering a new interpretation, a new version embodying the
normative commitments of the client. It means examining poor clients'
narrative accounts of their injuries and asking what it would mean for
the law and the legal system to take those accounts seriously. 231
Although it is the client who should speak of and name the injustice at
hand, it is the lawyer who must discover the deep processes through
which the injustice occurs, who must expose the myths in the law under-
lying the universalized narrative. This entails the lawyer's role as trans-
lator: interpreting, understanding, and then revealing the relationship
between the client's perspective and the law.232
227. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 14, at 2145 (discussing
technique of "emplacement": infusing lawyer dominated contexts with empowering images
and voices of clients).
228. Cf GEERTZ, supra note 17, at 136 ("The whole point of evoking rather than 'repre-
senting' [as an ideal for ethnographic discourse] is that it frees ethnography from mimesis and
the inappropriate mode of scientific rhetoric that entails 'objects,' 'facts,' 'descriptions,' 'induc-
tions,' 'generalizations,' 'verifications,' 'experiment,' 'truth,' and like concepts . . ").
229. See Abrams, supra note 33, at 395; cf GEERTZ, supra note 17, at 147 (purpose of
ethnographic texts is to enable conversation across societal lines).
230. White, Making Space for Clients, supra note 204, at 544.
231. See MINOW, supra note 40, at 310; Abrams, supra note 33, at 397, 400; Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1324-28 (1991)
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality].
232. An excellent example of the lawyer as translator approach to representation is the
Center for Constitutional Rights' challenge of the universalized narrative of self-defense in
State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). In Wanrow a jury convicted a Native
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In translating a client's story the lawyer must expose unstated as-
sumptions in universalized narratives in order to reveal the dissonance of
the client's narrative. It is the lawyer who directs the legal forum's atten-
tion to an alternative mode of storytelling; it is the lawyer who frames the
perspective and purpose of the client. The lawyer cannot be just a
mouthpiece for the client, however, and merely re-present the narrative
account the client originally told to the lawyer. Legal doctrine and pro-
cedure inhibit and impede such a telling, leaving undisturbed universal-
ized legal narratives to counter and mute the client's narrative.233 In
contrast, when the lawyer challenges universalized narratives as open to
transformation, she adopts a method of practice that can uncover miss-
ing perspectives and can explore the reasons for the exclusion. Poverty
law practice, so conceived, becomes grounded in the narrative contextu-
alizations of the disempowered subject.
C. Ethical Storytelling and Upholding Client Integrity
Under a critical storytelling approach to poverty lawyering, the law-
yer is responsible for legal strategy, but is constrained and guided by the
client's narrative perspective and purpose. Conceiving of the lawyer's
power and duty as guided by an "ethics of storytelling" 234 safeguards
both the client's voice and the lawyer's responsibility. The root of ethical
storytelling is the integration of legal argument and reason with the per-
sonal integrity of the client. Preserving and advancing the integrity of
the client's story and voice requires providing the legal forum with a
American woman of second degree murder for the shooting and killing of a white man whom
she believed was attempting to harm her and her children. The trial judge instructed the jury
to consider only the circumstances immediately preceding the incident and to apply the equal
force doctrine which defines and limits wholly justifiable self-defense to responding to an as-
sailant with equal force. The Center's lawyers obtained a reversal of Wanrow's conviction by
arguing an alternative interpretation and understanding of their client's story, one that did not
fit the universalized narrative of self-defense and equal force. They argued the jury instruc-
tions were flawed because they precluded the jury from judging the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's action from her perspective-a temporarily disabled Native American woman
defending her child against a white man who was a reputed child molester. Schneider, supra
note 51, at 606-10. See also Goldfarb, supra note 33, at 1635 (understanding particular women
and nonfit between their experiences and responses of specific institutions is basis of feminist
critical theory). By relying on their client's narrative perspective and experience, the Center
was able to reveal sex and race bias in the criminal justice system.
233. See, e.g., O'Barr & Conley, supra note 201, at 665-72 (describing legal inadequacy of
pro se narratives in small claims courts due to constraint of formal setting and rules).
234. I borrow and adapt the term from Ross, supra note 16, at 411; see Cunningham, The
Lawyer as Translator, supra note 142 (manuscript at 53-54) (discussing translator's ethic); see
also WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICs OF FIcTION 216-23 (1988)
(discussing "ethics of narration" in interaction between reader and author).
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contextualized presentation of the client, her situation, and her
experience.
Even when directed by the client's narrative purpose, the lawyer has
the power to choose among several interpretive subplots in telling the
story.235 The ethic of storytelling focuses that choice on the subplots that
preserve and translate the client's normative history and identity.236 Just
as "legal integrity" requires fitting current legal judgments into an ongo-
ing political narrative consistent with both past principles and future
commitments, 237 upholding client integrity requires fitting the client's
story and legal claim into her ongoing life narratives consistent with her
normative history and present identity.238
Linking client integrity to legal claims also serves the more instru-
mentalist purpose of providing a means to persuade those who hold
power about injustices faced by disempowered clients. The purpose of
the linkage is to join the client's narrative perspective with legal interpre-
tations in order to be persuasive legally as well as responsive to the cli-
ent's narrative purpose. This "provides a way of talking about those who
are left out or objectified, and a way of criticizing the law on that ba-
sis."'239 For example, the communicative medium of rights provides a
linkage between client narratives and the law in a form familiar to legal
decisiomakers. Rights claims demand attention and hold the potential
to make the powerful hear, if not respond. In this sense, deploying rights
235. See Bruner & Gorfain, supra note 157, at 62 (citing JACQUES DERRIDA, THE LAW OF
GENRE 55 (1980)); Littleton, Perspectives, supra note 173 (discussing complex choices facing
those who characterize battered women at trial). Such interpretive choices are similar to those
a judge faces when deciding which more or less equally applicable set of principles to rely upon
in her judgment story. See Michelman, supra note 17, at 67.
236. Cf Michelman, supra note 17, at 35 (analyzing Justice O'Connor's narrative choices
in her dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)).
237. DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 225-28. Dworkin seems to want to exclude from his
jurisprudential theory anything that might destabilize a judge's thoughtful dialogue with her
predecessors regarding the integration of a particular case with the general law. See Schlag,
supra note 18, at 920-25. Under the translation approach, client integrity is linked to legal
integrity in an effort to disturb that false stability and to force dialogue, either actual or meta-
phorical, between the judge and the disempowered client.
238. The translation approach to lawyering thus requires both "communicative action," in
which participant interaction is oriented toward reaching mutual understanding, and "strate-
gic communication," in which the prior goals of participants are furthered through interaction.
See JORGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EvoLuTION OF SOCIETY 117-20 (1979).
239. WHITE, supra note 218, at 223; cf White, The Ethics ofArgument, supra note 183, at
872 ("[lIt is the function of the lawyer... to persuade about the just and the unjust.., and to
do so ... among those who have power-in the courts, legislatures, and assemblies."). In the
same vein, Margaret Radin urges the pragmatist "to take the commitment to embodied per-
spective very seriously indeed, and especially the commitment to the perspective of those who
directly experience domination and oppression." Radin, supra note 19, at 1710.
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as a familiar concept and symbol in order to facilitate communication
between those with and without power is instrumental. The goal, how-
ever, is not to fit client stories and needs into universalized narratives of
rights, but to infuse rights with new meanings derived from the client's
narrative purpose and perspective. The translation of client rights talk
into legal argument merges the language and images of the client's daily
struggle with society's aspirational pronouncements in order to form a
vision of how things might and should be.24°
Maintaining fidelity to both the client and the law requires demon-
strating the nonfit between client claims and universalized legal narra-
tives. Lawyers can correct universalized narratives only when they assert
advocacy stories as alternatives to prevailing stock stories that do not fit
the client's narrative.2 41 Systematic juxtaposition of client and universal-
ized narratives is a method that can demonstrate the incompleteness (and
thus falsity) of universalization by highlighting the absence and impor-
tance of the client's perspective.2 42 Client narratives therefore hold the
potential to make judges aware of and acknowledge the perspective of
those excluded, and can empower lawyers with the ability to breathe life
into stale, abstracted legal rules and doctrines.z43 Grounding legal dis-
course in the narratives of disempowered clients thus endows legal insti-
tutions and decisionmakers with new accounts of the problems
disempowered people face, often on a mass scale:
Failure to translate for the client not only risks a dissatisfied client; it
also impoverishes the law. Like all forms of knowledge, law arises out
of experience. Clients are the source of that experience. Their under-
standing of that experience is likely to retain elements lost in the legal
understanding, elements that might enrich our legal knowledge.244
240. Catharine MacKinnon takes such an approach to sex discrimination, one that both
challenges and claims rights to equality: "Equality allows critique of the social partiality of
standards as well as opportunity to live up to existing ones. The contextual nature of the
equality right seems to me a strength: what it seeks is always real, because it is real for some-
one." MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 231, at 1326.
241. See Abrams, supra note 33, at 376; Goldfarb, supra note 33, at 1630-34.
242. See Abrams, supra note 33, at 392-93.
243. Cf WHITE, supra note 218, at 257-69 (justice as translation entails making new texts
in response to prior texts); Winter, supra note 30, at 2274-77 (when legal categories don't fit,
lawyer has opening to make transformative argument grounded in nonfitting experiences of
clients). The rectifying function of client narratives is a form of Aristotelian practical reason-
ing whereby an individual situation is first adjudged without resort to general rules. If the
general rules fail to take account of the individual situation, the universal can then be corrected
by reference to the specific. Practical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of feminist methodol-
ogy. See Bartlett, supra note 137, at 849-63; Goldfarb, supra note 33, at 1636-41.
244. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 22, at 2493 (emphasis in original).
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In sum, stories told in client narratives can unsettle preconceived
explanations of experience based on cultural stereotypes and assump-
tions, and can begin to supplant them with authentic accounts.245 They
hold power to reform the law.246
Telling client stories to fill gaps in legal knowledge and experience
entails providing narrative context that may be politically charged. Some
critical legal studies scholars have specifically called on lawyers to prac-
tice a litigative strategy of "politicization. '247 Politicization as they de-
scribe it, however, runs the risk of turning the lawyer into a political
opportunist who "discovers" for the client the political issues and values
at stake.248 The lawyer-as-political-radical approach to representation
invests the lawyer with power to manipulate the client's perspective, to
treat the client as a political opportunity, and to subordinate client narra-
tives to a political story scripted by the lawyer.
In contrast, the lawyer-as-translator approach reveals social and
political aspects of client claims to legal decisionmakers on the basis of
the client's perspective, as subplots running through the narrative of the
client's story wrapped up in the client's history and identity. It may be
245. See, eg., MINow, supra note 40, at 200, 230 (feminist narratives contest traditional
narratives that treat women as passive victims holding devalued roles and status); Schultz,
supra note 70, at 1815-39 (giving an alternative account of gender and work); Stephen Wizner,
Passion in Legal Argument and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Comment on Goldberg v. Kelly,
10 CARDOZO L. REv. 179, 183 (1988) (countering administrative procedure with "facts of
life").
246. The increasing social and judicial acceptance of the sexual harassment claim demon-
strates the law reform potential of ethical storytelling and the translation approach to practice.
Catharine MacKinnon, writing thirteen years ago, stated:
The strictures of the concept of sex discrimination will ultimately constrain those
aspects of women's oppression that will be legally recognized as discriminatory. At
the same time, women's experiences, expressed in their own way, can push to expand
that concept. Such an approach not only enriches the law, it begins to shape it so
that what really happens to women, not some male vision of what happens to wo-
men, is at the core of the legal prohibition. Women's lived-through experience...
[should] provide the starting point and context ....
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 26 (1979) (em-
phasis in original); see also Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal
Definitions, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1990). Today courts are starting to apply a "reason-
able woman" standard for determining whether certain acts in the workplace constitute sexual
harassment. See, eg., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991). For a discussion, see Susan
M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 299, 312-14 (1991).
247. E.g., Gabel & Harris, supra note 13, at 379-94.
248. See id. at 395-410 (discussing various ways lawyers can politicize "nonpolitical"
cases). But cf White, Lawyeringfor the Poor, supra note 171, at 872 ("Legal remedies that are
designed by lawyers to impose improved conditions upon the poor aren't likely to do much to
challenge subordination in the long run.").
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crucial to talk about a "fist in the face"; but it is the reality of a particular
fist in this client's face, rather than a political statement about power,
that must be translated. 249 Employed as an aspect of narrative contextu-
alization, politicization is properly limited by the storytelling ethic of cli-
ent integrity.
D. Spaces for Translating Client Narratives: Balancing, Hearing, and
Discretion
It is the genius of the law to provide a place in which unheard voices
can be heard and responded to; it is [the] task [of] lawyers to realize
this possibility.250
To be successful, translation must connect the perspective and pur-
pose of the disempowered client to the perspective and purpose of the
empowered decisionmaker. To do so, the poverty lawyer needs to iden-
tify and use spaces available in legal rituals for translating client narra-
tives. Such possibilities arise in hearings and in the judicial and
bureaucratic acts of balancing and discretion.
Despite its defects, 251 the administrative hearing can empower indi-
viduals with an opportunity to be heard, a chance to "bring the [bureau-
cratic] apparatus to a halt for a moment." 252 In the environment of the
hearing, the lawyer as translator can bring client and decisionmaker to-
gether in face-to-face dialogue. The crux of the dialogue is the integra-
tion of client integrity with legal arguments reenforced by the client's
own direct participation. Lucie White's story of Mrs. G. demonstrates
the possibilities of the hearing when the client departs from traditional
249. See MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 231, at 1285.
250. WHrrE, supra note 218, at 267; see White, Lawyeringfor the Poor, supra note 171, at
865 ("[Llaw [is] an irregular terrain, rich with unlikely sites for poor people to act out mo-
ments of resistance.").
251. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Supreme Court answered the question
of what process is due for AFDC recipients before the termination of their benefits by declar-
ing that such a determination must balance "the precise nature of the government function
involved [with] the private interest at stake." Id at 263 (citation omitted). Goldberg gave rise
to a bureaucratic regime of administrative hearings steeped in the legal formalism of proce-
dures, rules, and regulations. The formal procedures, however, protect only those who can
demand them; they do little to deter systematic welfare agency intransigence and do even less
to compel wholesale restructuring or reform. See Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process,
3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 236 (1991) [hereinafter Farina, Due Process]; White, Lawyering
for the Poor, supra note 171, at 865-69. The remedy of the hearing has reenforced the distinc-
tion and separation between adjudication at the hearing level and frontline bureaucratic ad-
ministration. The former is characterized by fairness in procedure, if not substance; the latter
is characterized by clerical tasks constrained by rigid rules and regulations. William H. Si-
mon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. Rnv.
777, 782-88 (1990).
252. White, Lawyeringfor the Poor, supra note 171, at 869.
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scripts written for the dependent, passive, and victimized.253 Making
room in the hearing for clients to speak out in their own voices may
compel the decisionmaker to hear the meanings and values within unre-
strained client narratives. Formal or informal adjudication of the client's
claim can be an opportunity for legal decisionmakers to learn from the
client's perspective as they decide what is right and just in the context of
the client's experience. 254
The hearing as a forum for translating client narratives has become
increasingly important as substantive developments in poverty law in the
1980s have shifted decisionmaking from federal regulatory practice to
state program, design, operation, and control. 255 For example, under the
JOBS program of the FSA, states are supposed to provide employment,
education, training, and child-care opportunities to qualified AFDC re-
cipients. 256 Recipients have a right to information about these services
and a right to a "dispute resolution" hearing if they disagree with their
assignment or lack of assignment in the program. 257 Because of the dis-
cretion given to states in administering the program, the fair hearing pro-
cess will be a significant means for both contesting and compelling state
action.258 As welfare programs shift to the states, proponents and ana-
lysts of the "new welfare"-which, for example, sometimes offers and
sometimes requires education and job training-are recognizing that ad-
ministrators in many cases will have to make individualized program de-
cisions. Thus to be effective, poverty lawyers will need to do more
outreach, provide more individual advice and representation, and bring
more cases calling for individualized decisions.259 Client narratives hold
253. See supra text accompanying notes 207-212. While recognizing that her client spoke
out at the hearing despite the traditional script prepared by the lawyer, White focuses her
concluding recommendations in Sunday Shoes on "relocat[ing] bureaucratized governance in
participatory institutions." White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 22, at 57. Although that is cer-
tainly a necessary public policy goal, she fails to underscore that her client, Mrs. G., demon-
strated that there in fact may be room for client narratives in bureaucratic hearings as they are
now structured; the lawyer simply fails to grasp the opportunity.
254. See Farina, Here to There, supra note 41, at 708 (feminist method and theory can
recreate administrative law by approaching adjudication as value generating and learning ex-
perience). On the legitimization and participatory values of face-to-face hearings in a bureau-
cratic context, see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
DISABILrrY 198-202 (1984).
255. See Alan W. Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the
1990s, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 831, 838-45 (1990).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 102-116.
257. See 42 U.S.C. § 682(c), (h) (1988).
258. Houseman, supra note 255, at 849-50.
259. Id. at 835, 844-45, 851-52.
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the potential to inform those bureaucratic decisions with context and
meaning.
Even when decisions are structured and disciplined by rules, those
rules often present choices for those who, in applying them, give the rules
their ultimate meanings.260 While rules of law are intended to curb dis-
cretion and prevent arbitrary results, there are few rules so formal that
they limit the judgment stories decisionmakers can tell to justify a re-
sult.261 This is why discretion in nonformal or bureaucratic settings is
often cursed as unjust and as the source of subjective, biased results.
Such dissatisfaction gave rise to the formal bureaucratic hearing: process
was prescribed in an effort to provide accountability, justification, and
legitimization for government decisions impacting upon individual rights
and interests.262 But mere insistence that rules be applied in accordance
with procedural safeguards does little to challenge the universalized legal
narratives in which the rules are embedded. Properly viewed, discretion
provides an opening for lawyers to make such challenges through the
translation of client narratives.
The "dilemma of discretion" is that it extends the opportunity for
individualized justice, fairness, and responsiveness, but also increases the
danger of arbitrariness, unpredictability, and inconsistency. 263 Despite
the dangers, there is an inevitable link between discretion and empathy,
the means for connecting the perspectives of client and decisionmaker.
Once it is accepted that discretion is fundamental to our legal system
even in formal due process settings, the lawyer can focus more on trans-
lating client narratives and less on exploiting and challenging technicali-
ties of due process requirements and formulae.
In translating client narratives, the hearing (whether formal or in-
formal) should be neither the means nor the end of the representational
strategy; rather, the hearing is the setting for bringing together client and
decisionmaker in an effort to call upon the latter to take account of and
260. E.g., Massaro, supra note 10, at 2110-16, 2118-19; James Boyd White, Law as Lan-
guage: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415, 435-36 (1982). Some legal
rules direct decisionmakers to focus on context either as a basis for applying an exception to a
rule or to give meaning to the operative term of a rule, such as "totality of the circumstances."
See Minow & Spelman, supra note 32, at 1644.
261. See, eg., Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness, supra note 157, at 1676
("Judges are portrayed [by divorce lawyers] in ways that suggest that they are capable of
making decisions on grounds that have nothing to do with facts or rules."); Scheppele, supra
note 140, at 2085 ("[T]here are few formal legal rules providing guidance on how the lawyer or
judge should structure stories.").
262. See supra note 251.
263. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 10, at 2116-20; Simon, Invention and Reinvention, supra
note 147, at 33.
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learn from the former's perspective and voice. The substantive goal is to
enable decisionmakers to act with enhanced knowledge of the law and
client; the process goal is empathic decisionmaking.264
By understanding hearing, balancing, and discretion as opportuni-
ties to translate client narratives in a process of empathic decisionmak-
ing, the lawyer adopts a "humanist vision" of judicial and bureaucratic
justice, in which procedural fairness "is a normative horizon rather than
a technical problem. '265 The humanist vision takes account of the dis-
juncture between equal and meaningful participation by treating client
participation in legal institutional processes as an opening for client nar-
ratives; what is asserted is the right to be heard and not merely the right
to a hearing. Hence, the lawyer's translation is an attempt to compel the
decisionmaker to hear the client's voice, understand the client's perspec-
tive, and feel the client's injury.
The lawyer's role, thus conceived, recalls Frank Michelman's notion
of "reconciliatory projects" involving themes of dialogue, history, re-
sponsibility, and identity.266 What is sought to be reconciled is legal and
client integrity. What is emphasized is the possibility of reconciling the
client's narrative perspective and the law-not by manipulating the cli-
ent's story to fit universalized legal narratives, but by highlighting its
nonfit and offering a counterstory with an alternative outcome. The deci-
sionmaker must be convinced that the alternative story is authentic, 267
one that investigates, questions, considers, connects, criticizes, and chal-
lenges competing perspectives and stories.268
In contextualizing legal arguments with the client's perspective, the
lawyer highlights how the client has been treated. The focus on treat-
ment comports with traditional due process concerns of protecting indi-
vidual expectations. 269 In translating client narratives, however, what is
264. Farina, Due Process, supra note 251, at 273-78.
265. White, Sunday Shoes; supra note 22, at 3 (emphasis in original).
266. Michelnan, supra note 17, at 31-34. "There are themes of dialogue: conversation,
inclusion, and recognition; themes of history: narration and continuation; themes of responsi-
bility: contextuality and immediacy; and themes of identity: shared humanity (including dif-
ference) and common good (including confrontation with difference)." Id. at 33.
267. On this point, Clifford Geertz, speaking of ethnographic literature, is instructive:
[To persuade readers ... that what they are reading is an authentic account by
someone personally acquainted with how life proceeds in some place, at some time,
among some group, is the basis upon which anything else ethnography seeks to do-
analyze, explain, amuse, disconcert, celebrate, edify, excuse, astonish, subvert-fi-
nally rests.
GEERTZ, supra note 17, at 143-44.
268. This is the essence of the feminist relational approach to legal analysis. See MINOW,
supra note 40, at 213.
269. Farina, Due Process, supra note 251, at 227-33.
April 1992]
taken from the client-the interest at stake-is a part of, not separate
from, that treatment.270 Cynthia Farina has observed that the images of
"entitlement" and "largess" are often invoked to define and separate in-
terest from treatment, in order to simplify and universalize the relation-
ship between government and citizen. The image of entitleinent is the
simple picture of a rightful demand by a citizen and the corresponding
absolute duty of a public official. The image of largess is the simple pic-
ture of a benevolent and powerful government dispensing privileges out
of generosity. Although each opposing image conflicts with our day-to-
day understanding of the complex government-citizen interaction, each is
invoked to portray a set of universalized assumptions about government,
people, power, and the law.271 Client narratives can dispel such univer-
salized assumptions by calling upon a decisionmaker's inherent discre-
tion to look at the intrinsic connection between treatment and interest in
a particular case.
Drawing strength from the disempowered client's own previously
silenced voice, translated client narratives hold possibilities for empathic
understanding not normally available in authoritative legal discourse.
The goal of translation, however, is not to evoke sympathy from the deci-
sionmaker. Sympathy for the poor and oppressed is part of the liberal
universalized legal narratives of victim, dependency, and passivity.272
Rather, empathic understanding entails comprehension and identifica-
tion with "the other"-her perspective, identity, history, motives, and
purpose.273 Empathic understanding-the goal of lawyer translation of
client narratives-calls upon the inherent abilities of decisionmakers to
hear, balance, and use discretion.
IV. A Storytelling Case Study: Savage v. AronSon 274
I now return to the case of Savage v. Aronson and examine the uni-
versalized legal narratives invoked by the lawyers for each side. The ex-
270. Focusing on the relationship between citizen and government is part of a liberal dig-
nitary theory of due process; contextualizing the interaction between citizen and government is
part of a feminist theory of due process. See Farina, Due Process, supra note 251, at 248-56; see
also Reich, The Individual Sector, supra note 155, at 1439-40 (putting forth a unified vision of
"due process").
271. Farina, Due Process, supra note 251, at 238-46.
272. On the dangers of appealing to the sympathy of the dominant class as a strategy for
representing the homeless, see White, "The Real Deal," supra note 53, at 291-308.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 174-177. Such understanding is the center of a
dialogic strategy in which empathy is much more than just a tool or technique. But cf Ste-
phen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1992).
274. At the outset, I emphasize that what follows is an application of the critical
storytelling analysis and synthesis in Parts II-III; it is not intended as criticism of clinical
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amination illustrates how representatives of the plaintiffs received client
stories but failed to draw upon the meanings within client narratives es-
sential for translating those stories in advocacy. Savage thus stands as an
example of both the possibilities and limits of the critical storytelling ap-
proach to poverty law advocacy.
The Homelessness Clinic of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Or-
ganization at the Yale Law School was one of the first legal organizations
in the country to do outreach on a regular basis to homeless people at
shelters, soup kitchens, and welfare motels. Outreach to potential clients
is necessary because the homeless almost always lack cars, telephones,
and other means for obtaining and retaining legal assistance. Between
the Clinic's founding, in 1986, and 1989, one of the fastest growing seg-
ments of the New Haven area population served by the Clinic consisted
of homeless families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
In addition to receiving basic grants for food, shelter, and other necessi-
ties, women receiving AFDC in Connecticut were eligible for up to 180
days of emergency housing assistance under an AFDC "special needs"
program administered by the Commissioner of the Department of In-
come Maintenance (DIM).275
Women and children receiving such assistance were relocated and
assigned to welfare motels or short-term lease apartments until the State
could obtain for them rent subsidies for permanent housing through
either the State-administered Rental Assistance Program (RAP) or the
federal Section 8 program. Up until the beginning of 1989, the State
through its various agencies had placed all recipients of emergency hous-
ing in permanent housing before their "special needs" funding ran out.
In May 1988, however, DIM changed its regulation and reduced the
education, which in my experience was the most rewarding aspect of law school. My choice of
this case is based on my involvement as a member of the clinic and my access to case materials.
See supra note 22. For two other accounts of Savage, see Stephen Wizner, Homelessness:
Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 387 (1990-91) [hereinafter Wizner,
Homelessness], and Robert A. Solomon, Acting Like Lawyers; YALE L. REP., Spring 1991, at
18. For background on the problem of homelessness in New Haven and the community
involvement of Yale Legal Services in providing shelter and low-income housing, see ADAM
BERGER, HIRAM CHODOSH & RONALD SLYE, HOMES FOR THE HOMELESS: A HANDBOOK
FOR ACTION (1990).
275. Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 259, 571 A.2d 696, 699 (1990). In its state plan
required by federal AFDC regulations, DIM defined the special need of emergency housing as
"housing which serves as a temporary shelter until permanent housing is secured, including
but not limited to, commercial lodging, shelters for the homeless and shelters for victims of
domestic violence. Emergency housing shall not include temporary residence with a friend or
relative." Connecticut Dep't Income Maintenance State Plan filed pursuant to 45 C.F.R.
§ 201.2 (1991) under Title IV of the Social Security Act, Attachment 2.3A at 7(b) (May 1,
1988).
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maximum period for receiving emergency housing assistance to one hun-
dred days. At the same time, funding for RAP and Section 8 rental sub-
sidies was drying up, and low income housing was growing scarcer. The
new regulation did not take effect until January 1, 1989, meaning that
those already in emergency housing on that date would have to find per-
manent housing by April 10 or face eviction.276
In early March, during their weekly outreach to welfare motels,
Clinic members learned that women had begun receiving notices from
DIM informing them about the impending termination of their emer-
gency housing assistance and instructing them to meet with a Depart-
ment of Human Resources (DHR) caseworker for assistance. After
meeting with officials from both DHR and DIM, Clinic members and
their clients were assured that alternative housing would be provided
prior to any eviction. However, after further outreach to the welfare mo-
tels, Clinic members learned that many emergency housing recipients
were being offered lodging in congregate shelters far from N\\ew Haven,
while others were being offered no relocation assistance at all. As the
April 10 deadline neared, the Clinic decided to take action and filed suit
to enjoin the state from discontinuing its emergency housing assistance
until recipients could be guaranteed appropriate permanent housing.
Members of the Clinic fashioned their litigation strategy without
any real input from the clients they were representing. This approach to
representation was necessary for two reasons: time constraints imposed
by the impending April 10 deadline; and the fluid, almost amorphous
nature of the potential client base. Although Clinic members had made
contacts and established lawyer-client relations with various welfare
motel residents in the three or four months prior to the lawsuit, ongoing
contact and representation were difficult due to the clients' homeless con-
dition. While unavoidable, the lack of interaction and dialogue between
lawyers and clients prior to the decision to litigate resulted in a primary
focus on a narrowly-defined legal problem (the failure of DIM to live up
to the statutory language in Connecticut's child welfare statutes) and a
partial disregard for the clients' perspectives of the dispute and the harm
that required remedying. In short, client stories, while compelling and
moving, were only elicited to fit the chosen legal narrative.
276. Savage, 214 Conn. at 259, 571 A.2d at 699.
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A. Universalized Legal Narratives
(1) Narratives Invoked by the Clinic
From the beginning, the Clinic's litigation strategy centered on stat-
utory language and administrative agency duties. The stories clients told
to Clinic members were received only as factual background. Members
of the Clinic chose not to argue that homeless families in Connecticut
have a "right to shelter," because of the lack of hospitable language in
the state constitution. 277 It was only after client stories were elicited and
the original complaint was filed that the Clinic amended its complaint to
include rights claims by the homeless plaintiffs: a federal constitutional
claim based on the fundamental right to family integrity, and a state con-
stitutional claim based on the right to education.278 The primary reason
for invoking the constitutional claims was tactical: combining constitu-
tional rights claims with statutory duty claims ensured that the latter
would not be dismissed based on state defenses of sovereign immunity
and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.279
Client stories formed the core of litigation strategy only at the tem-
porary injunction stage. There, client narratives spoken in client voices
had the desired impact of showing irreparable harm, moving the judge to
grant the crucial temporary injunction. In subsequent stages, however,
client stories were marginalized, making only an occasional appearance
in legal reasoning and claims. On appeal, the legal battle turned on what
DIM could or could not do based on interpretations of statutory and
regulatory language.
In challenging DIM's regulation limiting emergency housing to one
hundred days, the Clinic relied primarily on two statutes governing the
administration of AFDC: Connecticut General Statutes sections 17-
82d(a) and 17-85(a). Section 17-82d(a) provides that the Commissioner
of DIM shall grant aid "as is needed.., in the case of aid to dependent
children, to enable the relative to support such dependent child or children
277. Advocates and courts in some states have based the right to shelter on state constitu-
tional "needy persons" and health and welfare provisions. Eg., McCain v. Koch, 127 Misc.2d
23, 24, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Callahan v. Carey, No. 42482/79 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 1979), reported in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10; see John C. Connell, A
Right to Emergency Shelter for the Homeless Under the New Jersey Constitution, 18 RUTGERS
L.J. 765, 795-800 (1987); James K. Langdon & Mark A. Kass, Homelessness in America:
Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19 COLrM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 305, 337 (1985); Christine R.
Ladd, Note, A Right to Shelter for the Homeless in New York State, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272,
281-85 (1986).
278. For an analysis of fundamental rights of children to education and a stable family
environment, and of the harms of homelessness to children, see Herr, supra note 119.
279. See Savage, 214 Conn. at 264-70, 571 A.2d at 701-04.
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and himself, in health and decency .... "280 The Clinic argued that sec-
tion 17-82d(a) established a nondiscretionary "minimum floor [of assist-
ance] below which the Commissioner [could] not go."' 281 Section 17-
85(a) provides that:
any relative having a dependent child or dependent children, who is
unable to furnish suitable support therefor in his own home, shall be
eligible to apply for and receive the aid [AFDC] authorized by this
part .... Each such dependent child shall be supported in a home in
this state, suitable for his upbringing, which such relative maintains as
his own.28
2
The Clinic argued that section 17-85(a) was a "command from the legis-
lature that AFDC recipients receive such aid as will allow them to raise
their dependent children in their own home. '283
Because the Clinic's strategy focused on the above statutory lan-
guage and DIM's consequent duties, the Clinic attempted to fit the situa-
tion of its homeless clients within the language of the statute. The Clinic
argued that failure of DIM to continue paying for emergency housing
would result in the failure of the homeless women to keep their chil-
dren-as mandated by the two statutes-in "health and decency" and in
a "home ... suitable for [their] upbringing." This approach, which I
call the "failure-dependency argument," was consistent with established
Connecticut case law. For example, in Langs v. Harder28 4 the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court found that:
The [AFDC] policy.., is to provide a means of support for children
dependent on relatives who are unable to furnish suitable support. In
providing this aid, "need" has been established as the standard of eligi-
bility, and has been legislatively determined as that financial situation
not capable of providing a "reasonable standard of health and
decency." 285
The failure-dependency argument also had a proven track record.
Homeless advocates in a number of other states had successfully argued
280. CorN. GEN. STAT. § 17-82d(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
281. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Injunction at 5,
Savage v. Aronson, No. CVNH-8904-3142 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hsing. Sess. Apr. 10, 1989),
rev'd, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' April 10 Memorandum].
282. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17-85(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
283. Plaintiffs' April 10 Memorandum, supra note 281, at 6.
284. 165 Conn. 490, 338 A.2d 458 (1973).
285. Id. at 502-03, 338 A.2d at 464-65 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-82, 17-85), quoted
in Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Injunction
at 4, Savage v. Aronson, No. CVNH-8904-3142 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hsing. Sess. Jun. 29, 1989),
rev'd, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' June 29 Memorandum] and
Memorandum of Decision at 17, Savage v. Aronson, No. CVNH 8904-3142 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Hsing. Sess. Sept. 20, 1989), rev'd, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) [hereinafter September
20 Decision].
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that state AFDC statutes and child welfare laws gave state agencies the
duty to provide assistance in sufficient amount and duration to prevent
recipient mothers from failing to keep their children in health and de-
cency.28 6 To demonstrate the risks of unhealthiness, indecency, and un-
suitability, the Clinic invoked the universalized legal narrative of the
welfare mother as "incapable" and "dependent," while largely overlook-
ing the contradictions within state policy, law, and action.
In order to obtain the temporary injunction, the Clinic had to show
that irreparable harm would result without a court order freezing the
status quo. The Clinic decided that the harm they should attempt to
prove was the risk of homelessness. Based on the method of fitting client
situations into statutory words, the Clinic argued that the "health and
decency" requirement of section 17-85 required DIM to provide a grant
level "sufficient to avoid homelessness. s287 This put the Clinic in the
awkward position of contending that housing women and their children
in welfare motels would prevent the plaintiffs from becoming homeless:
"If a temporary injunction is not issued to prevent [DIM] from discon-
tinuing payment for plaintiffs' emergency housing, plaintiffs will become
homeless."288
By claiming that their homeless clients were in fact not yet home-
less, the Clinic embraced the State's own definition: "[IH]omeless person
means any person who does not have overnight shelter or sufficient in-
come or resources to secure such shelter. ' 28 9 This definition of "home-
less" reduces and decontextualizes the complex situation of homeless
families to a single characteristic-not having a roof over their heads
during the night. Based on this definition, and the Clinic's failure to
challenge it, the State argued that the "cases cited by plaintiffs [for sup-
port] are readily distinguishable from [this] case. . . .Many [of those
cases] involve assistance to homeless persons. Defendant would point
out, once again, that.., none of the plaintiffs in the instant action are
286. See HOMELESSNESS TASK FORCE, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A LmGATIoN
MEMORANDUM FOR LEGAL SERVICES ADVOCATES 4-16 (National Clearinghouse for Legal
Services No. 40,999, 1986).
287. Plaintiffs' June 29 Memorandum, supra note 285, at 5.
288. Plaintiffs' April 10 Memorandum, supra note 281, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
289. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Application for Temporary
Injunction at 23, Savage v. Aronson, No. CVNH-8904-3142 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hsing. Sess.
May 23, 1989), rev'd, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) [hereinafter Defendant's May 23
Memorandum] (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-355). This narrow conceptualization of
homelessness comports with the much criticized federal definition adopted by the Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (1988).
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'homeless'-overnight shelter will be found for them if they request it
"290
With respect to the constitutional claims, in asserting that termina-
tion of emergency housing benefits threatened their clients' rights to fam-
ily integrity, the Clinic argued that such a termination could result in "a
parent being unable to care for her child-thus the child can be found to
be neglected or uncared-for. ' '291 To support the proposition that termi-
nation of emergency housing assistance violated the state policy of child
protection under the State's child welfare laws, the Clinic coupled the
image of the welfare mother as incapable with a plea for state interven-
tion to rescue children from their homeless mothers: "a child or youth
may be found 'uncared for' who is homeless or whose home cannot pro-
vide the specialized care which his physical, emotional or mental condi-
tion requires. 292 Although invoking such images had the desired effect
on the trial judge,293 they were contrary to the claiming narratives of
rights and dignity spoken by the women in court.294
(2) Narratives Invoked by the State
To counter the Clinic's demonstration of plaintiff harm due to
DIM's failure to fulfill its statutory duty, the State invoked images de-
rived from the legal narrative of welfare mothers as the unworthy poor
with an overabundance of demands. This strategy was buttressed by
continual emphasis on a public/private distinction: the unfortunate cir-
cumstances of the plaintiffs were the result of individual private deeds or
misfortune, distinct from the public acts of DIM. The State argued that
the cause of the unfortunate situation in which the plaintiffs now find
themselves is not properly attributable to the one hundred day limita-
tion (and plaintiffs' exhaustion of that limitation) of DIM's special
290. Defendant's May 23 Memorandum, supra note 289, at 28.
291. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of First Amended Complaint at 3, Savage v.
Aronson, No. CVNH-8904-3142 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hsing. Sess. Apr. 28, 1989), rev'd, 214
Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' April 28 Memorandum]. "The Com-
missioner of Children and Youth Services may find that plaintiffs' dependent children, because
they are 'uncared for' or are treated with 'neglect,' are not being properly treated. Pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 17-38, these children will be at risk of being removed ... from
plaintiff-custodians." Complaint at 21, Savage v. Aronson, No. CVNH-8904-3412 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Hsing. Sess. Apr. 10, 1989), rev'd, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990).
292. Plaintiffs' April 10 Memorandum, supra note 281, at 10 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-120). "Once homeless, these children are-in the eyes of the State Legislature-'un-
cared for' and at risk of removal from the family by the State." Id. at 11.
293. See September 20 Decision, supra note 285, at 25-26 (finding that DIM regulation
terminating emergency housing assistance after one hundred days violates state child welfare
policy by rendering plaintiffs' children homeless and thus uncared for).
294. See supra text accompanying note 2; infra text accompanying notes 317-319, 333-334.
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needs emergency housing benefits. Each of the plaintiffs in this action
lost her permanent housing some months ago for diverse reasons such
as eviction, natural catastrophe, lock-out or other involuntary cause.
Those were the reasons plaintiffs [found] themselves without perma-
nent housing. It was not [attributable to] the defendant DIM .... 295
The State placed blame on the homeless mothers for failing to obtain
permanent housing on their own during the one hundred day period.
Drawing the inference that requests by the plaintiffs for more than one
hundred days were unreasonable, and depicting the emergency housing
program as "temporary," 296 the State reasoned that "[o]ne can surely
understand why an emergency program is of short duration. The fact
that a family may not be able to care for its internal needs after this
durational period is surely not of DIM's doing. ' 297 The State went so far
as to claim that the purpose of the one hundred day limitation was "to
better aid [DIM's] clients in attaining self-sufficiency. '298 Under this in-
terpretation, forcing homeless mothers and their children out of emer-
gency housing by enforcing the one hundred day limitation served the
therapeutic function of "curing" welfare mothers of their dependency on
DIM.
DIM's reasoning was blind to the plaintiffs' reliance on the State's
previous promise to assist them in locating permanent housing and to
provide them with rental subsidies-a promise the State would fulfill
only if plaintiffs first endured the hardships of residing in welfare mo-
tels.299 DIM's argument was framed in a vacuum, uninformed by social
science data and the opinion of many experts that homelessness is not a
temporary emergency experienced by a few isolated individuals, but a
systemic socioeconomic problem requiring comprehensive solutions.3°°
295. Defendant's May 23 Memorandum, supra note 289, at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
296. Id at 3 (stating that purpose of DIM's emergency housing program was to give dislo-
cated AFDC families on a temporary basis a "reasonable (but not indefinite) interval in which
to locate permanent housing").
297. Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief at 11, Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 571
A.2d 696 (1990) (No. 13796) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Defendant's Reply Brief].
298. iL at 1. Blaming the homeless for their troubles while portraying them as rational
decisionmakers who act with full information and a range of choices is part of the conservative
narrative of homelessness. In this narrative most homeless mothers choose to stay in emer-
gency housing instead of doubling-up with other families or finding other inexpensive apart-
ments because state welfare policies allow them to do so and excuse their lack of effort.
Regulations like DIM's one hundred day limitation on emergency housing, therefore, are in-
tended to separate the worthy from the unworthy homeless. See Wizner, Homelessness, supra
note 274, at 392-98 (criticizing Robert C. Ellickson, The Homelessness Muddle, 99 PuB. IN-
TERESr 45 (1990)).
299. See supra note 275 (quoting Connecticut State Plan).
300. See, eg., MARJORIE HOPE & JAMES YOUNG, THE FACES OF HOMELESSNESS 231,
269 (1986); F. STEVEN REDBURN & TERRY F. Buss, RESPONDING TO AMERICA's HOMELESS
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The State's justification and rationale for the one hundred day limitation
also ignored the context in which assistance was being withdravm:
mothers struggling daily to survive and provide their children with food,
shelter, protection, education, and other forms of care. Ignoring the con-
sequences of withdrawing assistance and relocating homeless families to
overnight shelters, the State obtusely asserted:
[DIM] indicated [its] sympathy for plaintiffs... but, it is submitted,
that persons, such as the plaintiffs herein, who had been involuntarily
displaced from their permanent housing and are living in temporary
emergency housing, should not reasonably expect not to suffer some
hardship and inconvenience until they once again find permanent
housing.30 1
The contextualization provided by client narratives voiced at the
hearing for temporary injunction was dismissed by the State as "imagery
that has no relationship to the record. ' 302 In countering the Clinic's ar-
guments that DIM's actions were creating a larger homeless population,
expelling families from emergency housing, and subjecting AFDC recipi-
ents to multiple housing transfers, the State focused on the "simple fact"
that DIM itself did not create the homeless population or evict homeless
families. 303 This restricted view of state action is based on rigid private/
public act distinctions that ignore cause and effect and the impact of state
inaction as well as action.304
4-10 (1986); PETER H. Rossi, DowN ANED OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS oF HOMELESS-
NESS (1989).
In equating "emergency" with "short duration," the state relied upon a (then) proposed
federal rule that advocated doing away with emergency housing assistance under the AFDC
special needs program and limiting all forms of emergency assistance to 30 days. The "Family
Support Administration," which proposed the regulation change, supported its recommenda-
tion by asserting that the purpose of the emergency assistance program was "to enable State
welfare agencies to act quickly to provide families with children with short-term assistance
and/or services to meet needs arising from emergencies." 52 Fed. Reg. 47,420, 47,421 (1987)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 233) (proposed Dec. 14, 1987) (emphasis in original). The
proposal failed to explain why "emergencies" necessarily last less than 30 days or why the
ceiling of 30 days assistance is sufficient to remedy all "emergencies." This type of "skewing of
policy" has institutionalized emergency relief as the permanent state response to homelessness.
See White, "The Real Deal," supra note 53, at 296-98.
301. Defendant's May 23 Memorandum, supra note 289, at 27. Another example of this
type of decontextualization is provided by the state's rebuttal to the Clinic's argument that
transferring plaintiffs to distant overnight shelters violated the state constitutional right to
education. The state attempted to trivialize the effects of such transferral on impoverished
children, stating: "At most plaintiffs [sic] testimony and evidence at the hearing was to the
effect that the temporary dislocation that living in temporary housing often causes, makes it
difficult for some of plaintiffs [sic] minor children to attend school as regularly as they would
like. .. ." Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
302. Defendant's Reply Brief, supra note 297, at 9.
303. Id. at 9-10.
304. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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Thus, in the State's story DIM's enactment of the one hundred day
emergency housing assistance limitation (decreasing the previous maxi-
mum by eighty days) without providing for any exceptions was not state
action causing unjustifiable harm; neither was DIM's enforcement of the
regulation by stopping payments to welfare motel owners, despite the
foreseeable effect of forcing mothers and children to "double-up," to ac-
cept overnight shelter in remote locations, or to find other ways to fend
for themselves. DIM looked to the statutory text and administrative reg-
ulations and found no obligation to locate housing or make any excep-
tions for members of the plaintiff class: DIM's responsibility was merely
to pay owners of welfare motels for housing homeless mothers and their
children. According to the State's story, the fact that many of the plain-
tiffs had not moved on prior to the end of the DIM-imposed one hundred
days was not the result of any action taken by DIM.30 5 The State con-
cluded that "[t]he [state] interference with family structure alleged... is
too remote, too indirect and too tenuous to constitute a violation of the
plaintiffs' asserted rights to 'family integrity.' ,,306
B. Receiving Client Stories
As I noted, the Clinic was extremely successful at the temporary
injunction stage of the lawsuit in showing the irreparable harm faced by
the plaintiffs as a result of DIM's planned enforcement of the one hun-
dred day limitation. But as I also noted, members of the Clinic originally
elicited those client stories subsequent to making the strategic decisions
about litigation. This chronology is not uncommon in class action and
law reform litigation. Given the Clinic's resource and time scarcity-
common to all legal services organizations-the sequence may have been
necessary. However, in eliciting client stories for the purpose of fitting
client facts into universalized legal narratives that the Clinic had already
chosen, the Clinic transformed and recomposed its clients' stories.30 7
The result was that the Clinic did not fully translate its clients' stories in
305. Defendant's May 23 Memorandum, supra note 289, at 10, 14-16.
306. Id. at 30, 36 (citing Rosado v. Hecder, No. H-85-171, slip op. at 21 (D. Conn. 1986)
(holding that change in AFDC conditions of eligibility did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional
rights)).
307.
[In Savage] we began by brainstorming, listing all possible causes of action, then
breaking down each cause of action into its elements and each element into facts we
would have to prove ....
The factual aspect of the case [was] a top priority, with students developing
individual stories and expert testimony to establish [our] conclusion[s].
Solomon, supra note 274, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
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advocacy, and failed to highlight the inherent contradictions in the
State's arguments and actions.
Before the Clinic decided to file suit against DIM, members of the
Clinic had made regular outreach visits to residents of three or four wel-
fare motels in New Haven. Clinic members had gone door to door, talk-
ing with residents, asking if they were having any problems with their
caseworkers or the motel owners. Although occasionally rewarded with
a "case" (typically entailing phone calls on a client's behalf regarding a
late benefits payment or an inquiry as to a client's eligibility for addi-
tional benefits), the presence of Clinic members put motel owners and
residents alike on notice that the Homelessness Clinic was monitoring
the conditions at the motels. Clinic members performing this outreach
generally referred to residents of the motels as their clients, despite the
absence of formal, agreed upon lawyer-client relations. This perspective
may partially account for the Clinic's willingness to impute to clients
litigation goals, including choice of strategy.
The standard outreach questionnaire used by members of the Clinic
demonstrates its preoccupation with and primary focus on legal
problems devoid of contextualization provided by other elements of cli-
ent stories.30 8 The questionnaire begins with requests for necessary infor-
mation such as name, room number, and caseworker. It continues with a
series of questions about reasons for moving to emergency housing, inter-
actions with the motel owner, food arrangements, room conditions, and
problems resulting from the burdens of emergency housing such as diffi-
culties locating permanent housing and obtaining housing subsidies.30 9
Though direct and to the point, the questionnaire gave welfare motel
residents little opportunity to reveal their histories, beliefs, identities, and
narrative perspectives. 310
308. On elements of client stories, see supra Section II.B.(l).
309. YALE LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION, HOMELESSNESS CLINIC MOTEL OUT-
REACH QUESTIONNAIRE (Spring 1989) (on file with author).
310. The interviewing questionnaire structured initial interviews between Clinic members
and clients in a manner consistent with interviewing tips and information distributed to all
Clinic members at the beginning of the semester. I believe the packet of information was
borrowed from New Haven Legal Assistance. The information resembles that which might be
distributed at a legal services "how-to" workshop for attorneys.
Although generally sensitive to the impact of interviewing method on the story received,
the information packet emphasizes that it is the lawyer's job to determine what is relevant and
irrelevant, to teach the client what is expected of her during the interview, and to judge what
the client is saying and how she is saying it in order to assess the client's reliability. YALE
LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION, HOMELESSNESS CLINIC INTERVIEW EXERCISE PACKET
16-23 (distributed Spring 1989) (on file with author). "The object of maximizing [lawyer-
client] communication is, after all, to enable the attorney to obtain the information s/he needs
to solve the client's problem." Id. at 23. On how this traditional approach to interviewing
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After the Clinic decided to litigate the DIM regulation, members
began searching for clients who fit the litigation strategy to demonstrate
immediate irreparable harm. Clinic members searched for hotel resi-
dents who would make "good" clients, meaning those who could evoke
sympathy from the court and attest to prospective harm involving the
risks of unhealthiness, indecency, and unsuitability-the infirmities
AFDC laws governing DIM were intended to prevent and cure.3"1 The
Clinic thus adopted a method of triage client selection.312 This had the
harmful effect of excluding many prospective clients who did not fit the
desired proffle. The effect was harmful because those not included as
class representatives did not benefit from direct participation in the hear-
ing for temporary injunction. Furthermore, they lost the opportunity to
receive direct notice and follow-up attention from the Clinic regarding
class member rights under the court's orders. 313
C. Translating Client Stories
At the hearing, plaintiffs told compelling stories of hardship and
harm, moving the court to grant the temporary injunction. 314 By creat-
ing space in the hearing for their clients to tell stories in their own narra-
tives, the Clinic integrated client narratives with legal claims of harm,
may overlook or suppress client narratives contextualizing the client's problem to the detri-
ment of both lawyer and client, see supra Part II.
311. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-82d(a), 17-85(a) (1988).
312. On triage, see supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. The Clinic devised a
special outreach form entitled: "Emergency Housing Questionnaire: Lawsuit Testimony."
The Clinic structured the questionnaire to solicit quickly the following information: (1) Dead-
line for leaving emergency housing; (2) alternative places to stay; (3) whether a caseworker had
informed the resident of possible places to go after the deadline expired; (4) whether relocation
after the deadline would pose any extra problems for locating permanent housing, obtaining
transportation, or getting children to doctors or schools.
To be accepted as a client, an interviewee needed to give at least some of the following
answers: (1) Her deadline for emergency housing had expired or soon would; (2) she had no
alternative places to stay or was trying to "double-up" with another AFDC or public housing
recipient; (3) her caseworker had not referred her to any alternative housing, she had been
promised but had not yet received a housing voucher, she had received a voucher that was
unusable due to lack of available housing, or she had been offered overnight shelter at a distant
location; (4) relocation to an alternative shelter would disrupt her search for a permanent
home or her children's schooling or healthcare.
313. See Hearing Transcript at 213-15, Savage v. Aronson, No. CVNH-8904-3142 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Hsing. Sess. Apr. 14, 1989), rev'd, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) [hereinafter
April 14 Hearing Transcript] (colloquy between lawyers and judge indicating the logistical
difficulties of proposed class-wide notice plan); April 18 Hearing Transcript, supra note 2, at
93-94 (testimony by plaintiff that subsequent to issuance of temporary injunction and order for
class-wide notice her caseworker had failed to inform her about her rights under the order).
314. See September 20 Decision, supra note 285, at 37.
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thus translating client stories in advocacy. 315 Altogether, seven different
women spoke out in court, painting a "vivid portrait of the plight of
those who f[ound] themselves and their children facing homelessness"
and providing testimony the trial judge found "eloquent." 316
Dawn E. told her story about an endless search for an apartment,
eviction from a welfare motel room, frantic search for someplace to
spend the night, temporarily sharing cramped quarters at her parents,
the uselessness of a Section 8 housing voucher, worthless housing refer-
rals from her caseworkers, having to quit her job training program to
search for an apartment, consequently losing her opportunity for regular
employment, and her son's worsening health condition and school per-
formance.317 Melissa H., a twenty-year-old mother of four children, told
her story about her inspection of the only prospective permanent apart-
ment assigned to her, and her discovery of boards on the windows, gar-
bage in the yard, and drug dealers in the neighborhood. She also told
how her caseworker offered overnight shelter in another city without of-
fering transportation for her oldest daughter to get to school or her sick
baby to get to her doctor's appointments. 318 Maria C. told her story
about being denied a Section 8 housing subsidy because of an unsettled
dispute with a former landlord, her caseworker's suggestion that she
should either go "back to" Puerto Rico or accept overnight shelter in
another city, her fear that without permanent housing in New Haven she
might lose visitation rights to her four children then in foster care, her
battle to overcome drug addiction, and her long, fruitless search to find
an affordable apartment with enough bedrooms to reunite her family.319
Despite the Clinic's success at the injunction stage, it ultimately lost
on appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court. It is not my purpose to
speculate on whether an alternative litigation strategy would have pro-
duced a different result.320 Obviously, the most important goal from the
315. Each testifying plaintiff was asked questions extending beyond the immediate legal
problem, including questions about her living conditions prior to emergency housing, why and
how she ended up in emergency housing, and problems she had encountered in the search for
permanent housing. This line of questioning enabled a client's narrative perspective to emerge
during testimony and provided the judge with a sense of the client's identity and history.
Thus, members of the Clinic were quite successful in finding space for their clients to speak out
during the hearing, despite the state's constant objections of "irrelevancy." See, eg., April 14
Hearing Transcript, supra note 313, at 138, 156 (state's objections to questions about condi-
tions suffered by plaintiffs and Clinic's responding offer of proof); April 18 Hearing Transcript,
supra note 2, at 62-63, 69-71, 91 (same).
316. September 20 Decision, supra note 285, at 11, 30.
317. See April 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 313, at 135-53.
318. Id. at 154-81.
319. April 18 Hearing Transcript, supra note 2, at 58-76.
320. The Connecticut Supreme Court, keenly aware of the state's fiscal crisis, see Savage v.
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clients' standpoint was to prevent the state from stopping emergency
housing payments before they could find permanent housing.321 It is
clear, however, that the Supreme Court failed to apprehend the meaning
of the client stories it only briefly noted in its opinion.3 22 It is also clear
that the Clinic did not attempt to translate its clients' narratives and
thereby demonstrate the contradictions of the State's actions and their
harmful impact on the clients. The Clinic failed to link the rights talk of
its clients to the purposes underlying state policy and action. Instead, the
Clinic chose to focus its argument on what DIM could or could not do
under the statutes.3 23 Although on appeal the Clinic was without the
benefit of its clients' eloquent in-court testimony, which convincingly
brought to life experiences and claims, those narratives could have en-
lightened the abstract technical legal arguments in the Clinic's appellate
brief.
The court decided the case on the textual interpretation grounds the
Clinic argued, merely adopting the State's interpretation over the
Clinic's. The court held that the regulation limiting emergency housing
assistance to one hundred days did not conflict with Connecticut General
Statutes sections 17-82d and 17-85(a). The court found that section 17-
82d's language requiring AFDC in an amount sufficient to "support such
dependent child or children and himself, in health and decency" did not
"specifically relate to housing as compared to other necessities of life"
and was not "related to emergency housing or the duration of its availa-
bility."3 24 The court further found that section 17-85(a)'s language stat-
ing that "[e]ach... dependent child shall be supported in a home in this
state, suitable for his upbringing" was a condition of recipient eligibility,
and not a mandate requiring DIM to provide emergency housing assist-
ance until relocation to permanent housing.3 25
In narrowly construing the statute, the court adopted the State's
definition of "emergency," reasoning that the housing of homeless fami-
lies in welfare motels must be temporary and a last resort. The court also
Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 276-77, 571 A.2d 696, 707 (1990), might have found for the state no
matter what argument was put forth.
321. As Steve Wizner points out, theoretical or long-term policies or goals are of little
relevance to the homeless person's immediate needs, and the advocate's perspective must be
framed by the client's perspective. Wizner, Homelessness, supra note 274, at 390-91, 400. For
the plaintiffs in Savage, the case was won with the granting of the temporary injunction.
322. See Savage, 214 Conn. at 281-84, 287, 571 A.2d at 710-11, 712-13.
323. On the importance of linking the integrity of the client and her story with legal
claims, see supra Section III.C.
324. Savage, 214 Conn. at 272-73, 571 A.2d at 705 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17-82d)
(emphasis in original).
325. Id. at 274-75, 571 A.2d at 706-07.
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dismissed the constitutional claims, adopting the State's rigid distinction
between private and public actions: "The financial circumstances of
these plaintiffs, which are the root cause of their inability to obtain 'per-
manent' homes, have not been produced by any state action, an essential
requirement for invocation of the due process clauses of both our federal
and state constitutions. '326
Information revealed in client narratives pointed out that a number
of contradictory state actions were, in fact, immediate causes of plaintiffs'
homelessness, and that an attempt to find a single "root cause" was non-
sensical. Although being poor led to homelessness, client narratives re-
vealed market forces, broken promises by landlords and caseworkers,
and conflicting regulatory requirements as contributing causes. For ex-
ample, evidence at the hearing clearly established that DIM and DHR
had expected that, at the end of one hundred days, emergency housing
recipients would either find permanent housing with Section 8 vouchers,
accept relocation to overnight shelters, or double-up with family or
friends.327 These expectations, however, were contradicted by realities
explained in client narratives.
Clients spoke of receiving housing subsidy vouchers only days
before the State expected them to vacate their emergency housing. But a
voucher did not facilitate immediate transfer to permanent housing. Cli-
ent narratives told of long and frustrating searches for permanent hous-
ing, of weeks spent traveling from apartment referral to apartment
referral to find an apartment in the condition required by the housing
voucher: available, decent, safe, and affordable.328 The purpose of the
emergency housing program was to allow recipients an opportunity to
locate permanent housing, almost always with the assistance of a sub-
sidy. State actions delaying the issuance of the subsidy vouchers until the
day before emergency housing expired, combined with the State's knowl-
edge that it often took weeks to locate available and qualified housing,
clearly contradicted the purpose of DIM's own emergency housing
program.
Clients explained why it was not possible for them to accept reloca-
tion to far-away overnight shelters. Their narratives are infused with ac-
326. Id. at 284, 571 A.2d at 711 (rejecting plaintiffs' right to family integrity claim); see
also id. at 287, 571 A.2d at 713 (rejecting plaintiffs' right to education claim on same ground).
327. See, e.g., State Plan, supra note 275; Hearing Transcript at 84-109, Savage v. Aron-
son, No. CVNH-8904-3142 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hsing. Sess. April 25, 1989), rev'd, 214 Conn.
256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) (testimony of District Manager of DHR) [hereinafter April 25 Hear-
ing Transcript] .
328. E.g., April 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 313, at 136-43, 161-65, 177-79; April
18 Hearing Transcript, supra note 2, at 92-93, 119-21.
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knowledgment and acceptance of parental responsibilities to provide
adequate health care, suitable home environments, and sufficient educa-
tional opportunities for their children. DIM's actions compelling the
plaintiffs to accept distant relocation endangered their children's well-
being and were contrary to child welfare laws enforced by another arm of
the State, the Department of Children and Youth Services.329 Clients
reported how their caseworkers advised them to move in with parents or
friends, despite the knowledge that their parents and friends were them-
selves recipients of government housing subsidies. The clients knew that
such advice was contrary to state-enforced regulations that prohibit fami-
lies from doubling-up in public housing.330
Furthermore, "rights talk"331 within client narratives revealed other
contradictory state actions that helped perpetuate plaintiffs' homeless-
ness. For example, the State argued that the purpose of the one hundred
day regulation was to "better aid its clients in attaining self-suffi-
ciency. '3 32 The State's strict enforcement of the regulation without ex-
ception, appeal, or hearing, violated its very purpose. Dawn E., the
client who was forced to leave her job training program when her emer-
gency housing expired, poignantly depicted this contradiction:
[I]t's not fair that you can give somebody a helping hand and then
snatch it back because you don't want to take the responsibility to give
them adequate time--okay? I've been in school from 9:00 to 5:00;
there are people out there who are looking for adequate apartments.
There are people out there who are going to school. I was going to
school. I was going from 9:00 to 5:00. On my lunch hour, I did not
eat. I was looking for apartments.
After school, I was looking for apartments. Here I am today with
no apartment, no place to go in two weeks. You people didn't have to
pull this from under our legs; that was not right. That wasn't right.
And all I ask is that somebody says; "This is enough. You can't
put children out on the street. You can't put parents out on the street
like that. Give them adequate time or give them someplace to stay"
until you can help them find something. 333
The fundamental policy behind emergency housing was to afford re-
cipients time to find permanent housing. The failure of the State to issue
housing subsidies within the required one hundred days (or, alterna-
329. See April 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 313, at 150-52, 179-81; April 18 Hearing
Transcript, supra note 2, at 68-70, 74, 88-89, 100-01, 118-19, 123-24.
330. E.g., April 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 313, at 144.
331. See supra Section II.B.(2).
332. Defendant's Reply Brief, supra note 297, at 1; see April 18 Hearing Transcript, supra
note 2, at 135 (DIM Commissioner's testimony that policy underlying AFDC is to promote
independence through the provision of "special needs" housing, education, and training).
333. April 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 313, at 152-53.
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tively, the fact that the one hundred days was not enough time to issue
the housing subsidies) frustrated that policy. The rights talk of Melissa
H., who did not receive her Section 8 voucher until the very end of her
one hundred days, points out this contradiction:
[My] landlord said [that] [p]eople who are receiving Section 8 could
stay fhere. There is a lady down below me [a former recipient of
emergency housing] who is going to keep the apartment that she is in
[because she received Section 8]. I called the landlord and asked him if
I can keep my apartment, but he said no because he had rented it out
to somebody else, and I thought that was wrong because I should have
first priority to that apartment. 334
Rights talk within client narratives also demonstrated that the plain-
tiffs had done everything the State had required of them to receive safe,
decent, and affordable housing, and that it was the State that had failed
to live up to its promises and responsibilities under its own emergency
housing program. The one contradiction in state policy the Clinic relied
upon, the "dependency-failure" argument, actually projected the plain-
tiffs in an extremely vrulnerable, dependent, and incapable role. By argu-
ing that conditions of homelessness might be sufficient to bring charges of
child neglect and deprivation, the Clinic turned an inherently discrimina-
tory welfare mother contradiction 335 against its own clients instead of the
State.
Although the Clinic argued that state actions enforcing the one hun-
dred day regulation would violate plaintiffs' statutory and constitutional
rights, the arguments focused on abstract statutory and constitutional
language, unenlightened by client narratives. Those narratives had the
power to contextualize what those rights meant to their bearers and to
show how DIM's treatment of homeless women and children was insepa-
rable from their interests at stake. Instead, the Clinic implied that an
abstract right to housing or shelter was lurking within vague statutory
and constitutional language.336 The Clinic established that DIM inter-
preted its own emergency housing program as an "entitlement,"3 37 a con-
clusion the Clinic argued was mandated by sections 17-85(a) and 17-
82d(a). In its brief to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the Clinic argued
that those statutes established the State's "unqualified obligation" to en-
334. Id. at 159.
335. See supra Section I.D.
336. See, e.g., April 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 313, at 168-71 (colloquy between
Clinic's supervising attorney, state attorney, and judge regarding whether or not plaintiffs'
claim was for right to housing).
337. See April 25 Hearing Transcript, supra note 327, at 2 (testimony of DIM Commis-
sioner that emergency housing is an entitlement).
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sure that plaintiffs had housing.338 That obligation could have been qual-
ified by referencing state contradictions and client rights talk revealed by
plaintiff narratives.33 9 The failure to do so resulted in the court's focus
on the absolute demand of "entitlement" and the plaintiffs' seemingly
insatiable need for public assistance. 34°
In essence, the Clinic failed to translate what DIM's obligation to
the plaintiffs meant to the plaintiffs themselves. The client narratives re-
vealed that the State's obligation was both more and less than a weekly
payment to owners of welfare motels; it was an obligation to uphold the
State's own expressed policies, purposes, and promises to the plaintiffs,
and an obligation to consider the individual circumstances of recipients
who in good faith had attempted to find permanent housing in order to
move beyond their "emergency." Rather than affirmatively invoking cli-
ent narratives and translating them into legal arguments, the Clinic
briefly summarized client narratives and segregated them from the legal
arguments in the body of the appellate brief. Client narratives merely
provided a factual backdrop to evoke sympathy and to demonstrate the
clients' desperate circumstances and dependency on the State. Those cli-
ent narratives, however, when interpreted in their full context, told an-
other story: the story of dignity in dealing with caseworkers and a
bureaucracy seemingly bent on frustrating its own goals, of daily struggle
involving care, love, and sacrifice for children, and of belief in the right to
provide children with safe and decent homes and to get a fair shake at
becoming independent from the State.
338. Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief, supra note 3, at 12. Entitlement to housing is a solution to
homelessness often demanded by advocates for the homeless. See, e.g., Curtis Berger, Beyond
Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 315, 324 (1990-91). For a
discussion of the connection between government treatment and citizen interest and the defi-
ciency of the "entitlement" image for illuminating that connection, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 269-271.
339. Failure to qualify entitlements by reference to concrete client-state interactions
"reifi[es] individual rights and state power as distinct and opposed entities." Simon, Invention
and Reinvention, supra note 147, at 29. Winning recognition of the entitlement becomes an all-
or-nothing proposition. Client narratives, expressing real, nonabstracted rights and needs, can
define related state obligations. "In order to ward off frustration, welfare programs may not
need to satisfy clients' full 'material' needs, even as the clients themselves define them. But
those programs must treat poor people with dignity." White, Lawyeringfor the Poor, supra
note 171, at 874. See also Law, Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 143, at 810
(stating that poverty lawyers in Goldberg could have focused more on state's infirm reasons for
actions taken and plaintiffs' individual claims to subsistence benefits).
340. See Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 274-76, 571 A.2d 696, 706-07 (1990).
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Conclusion
Thinking about the poverty lawyer's work through the storytelling
typology-recognizing universalized narratives, receiving client stories,
translating client stories, and influencing judgment stories-reveals both
the power and limits of legal discourse. Critical storytelling analysis-
integrating feminist and other critical theories that examine the relation-
ship between the law and disempowered people-provides a compelling
critique of how the law and the lawyer can marginalize and ignore the
narratives of poor people, enforcing and contributing to their dis-
empowerment. Such critical analysis is premised upon the belief that the
poverty lawyer should oppose, rather than contribute to, structural forms
of subordination.
Universalized legal narratives shape and constrain both lawyer and
client understandings of events by imposing a standard, universalized ac-
count of human experiences and relationships. Assumptions and stereo-
types within such narratives exclude knowledge of the supposed subjects
of those narratives and often ring false when applied to real life situa-
tions. As authoritative explanations of what has happened in the past,
legal narratives can silence alternative meanings and suppress client
voices.
But legal principles, rules, and categories suffusing universalized
narratives do more than just affect how poor people publicly define them-
selves and their problems; they control and regulate private daily life,
shaping and influencing the storylines of the poor-the future direction
of their lives. In the bureaucratic tangle I have highlighted, "welfare
mother contradictions" enmesh poor mothers and their children in wel-
fare programs that are supposed to encourage independence by providing
"family support" and opportunity, but instead may increase recipients'
vulnerability and objectification. Despite the public control over their
lives, women on welfare exhibit strength and dignity in their daily strug-
gles to survive. A reverse contradiction is that state assistance can em-
power women, partially liberating them from abusive, dependent private
relationships and a subordinate market status.
To discover public contradictions and private acts of strength, the
lawyer needs to take account of the client's narrative perspective, and
recognize that the lawyer-client interaction defines and redefines percep-
tions of the legal problem, dispute, and injury at issue in the client's
claiming story. Disempowered people speak a language of rights to con-
vince both themselves and others that they have suffered injustice. Client
rights talk may not fit within the formalized or abstracted discourse of
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lawyers; it may, however, express meaning, purpose, and value critical to
making a convincing claim.
To discern client differences and normative commitments, the law-
yer must relax his privileged interpretive stance and create space for the
client to speak out in the lawyer's office, to develop and present her story
in her own narratives. Such dialectic interaction is a touchstone of femi-
nist method and practice. When lawyers misinterpret or subordinate cli-
ent narratives, they disregard the client's narrative purpose and her
perspective of the harm to be remedied, and may do violence to the cli-
ent's normative values and beliefs.
The lawyer holds great power over the telling of the client's story.
To be effective in advocacy and serve the client's real interests, the law-
yer's role should be to act as a translator in order to reveal the client's
narrative version despite the distortion of legal language and procedure.
In this respect, the lawyer acts as a facilitator, enabling dialogue across
lines of social difference that divide the client, law, and legal deci-
sionmaker. Translation entails stating unstated assumptions in univer-
salized narratives and exposing their nonfit with client narratives. By
linking the client's personal and narrative integrity with legal claims in
the judicial spaces of balancing, hearing, and discretion, the lawyer can
infuse legal categories with new meanings and supplant false stereotypes
and assumptions.
In integrating different strands of critical storytelling thought and
literature, my purpose has been to take a contextualized, comprehensive
look at the different ways stories are lived and told under the rule of law.
I harbor no illusions that my outline and discussion of the story typology
will somehow transform the difficult, resource-starved practice of pov-
erty law. It is my hope, however, that practitioners and scholars will see
the value and efficacy in critically viewing the receiving and telling of
stories as the medium of communication between the law, poverty law-
yer, disempowered client, and legal decisionmaker. Such an approach
may enhance representation and contribute to the ongoing project of in-
tegrating practice and theory for the purpose of better serving the human
rights and needs of disempowered people.
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